The taboo to be dispelled in the defence of Kyiv (and the EU) boils down to one word: victory

In the great existential struggle concerning the defence of Ukraine, there are several words that have become taboo over the years. One such taboo concerns ‘weapons’. Here, ‘weapons’ refers to the arms to be sent to Kyiv. Another taboo concerns ‘rearmament’. Here, ‘rearmament’ refers to the equipment Europe would need to defend itself against the very same threats that are aimed straight at the heart of Ukraine. Another taboo concerns the word ‘just’ to be placed after the word ‘peace’. Here, by ‘just’ – by ‘just peace’ – we mean not just any peace, but a peace that does not force the victim of aggression into a position where they must accept the principle that the borders of a sovereign state can be redrawn by force.

In the great existential test that is the defence of Ukraine, however, the word that tends to be dismissed with the greatest ease is another: the word ‘victory’. When discussing Ukraine, its defence, and the objectives of the Atlantic Alliance, the word ‘victory’ tends to be regarded as an unacceptable provocation. Not because it is impossible to win the war against Putin, but because talking about ‘victory’ forces one to set a goal, to point the way forward, to face up to reality. The point is clear. If you raise the idea that there might be a ‘victory’, you must first acknowledge the threat. If you recognise the scale of the threat, you must act accordingly. Whereas if you do not raise the possibility of a ‘victory’ – that is, if you take it for granted that whatever Putin sets out to achieve, he will achieve it anyway – it becomes easier to argue in favour of disengagement: why bother defending ourselves, since we’re not the ones who will win, are we? The taboo surrounding the war in Ukraine – ‘victory’ – is a term that fits the current state of the conflict, where victory is measured not only in square metres of territory but also in the kilometres of border between NATO and Russia that have been added following Finland’s accession to the Alliance (over 1,300), in Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU (a scenario Putin would gladly have avoided), and in Ukraine’s transformation into a technological outpost for European defence (not just for drones), has been debunked on two occasions in recent days.

Meloni did just that two days ago in her speech to Parliament, when she pointed out that defending Ukraine is not only right but also helps Kyiv to achieve its military objectives. Meloni pointed out that, in recent months, Russia has been “unable to make headway on the front line” (according to the report presented on 1 October by the Institute for the Study of War, the territorial updates for September recorded 175.54 square kilometres captured by the Russians and 256.35 square kilometres recaptured by the Ukrainians). She also pointed out that the violent Russian attacks are partly motivated by this: to try to “break the Ukrainian people through terror, the cold and the darkness, simply because Russia has failed to break them on the battlefield”. Meloni made this point, but so too – and above all – did NATO’s head of operations in Europe, General Alexus Grynkewich, earlier this week when he presented a plan in Warsaw for the Alliance’s deterrence in Europe, aptly named: ‘Theory of Victory’. Grynkewich spoke of defending NATO territory; he did not speak of how to secure a military victory for Kyiv, but it does not take much to realise that the two issues are closely linked.

Fanning the flames of defeatist rhetoric paralyses us and renders all support futile. Remembering that deterrence can be effective against the sponsors of terror, and that military support can yield results, empowers us and points to a possible way forward. Sending weapons remains a taboo for several political parties. Yet the taboo that weighs most heavily, when it comes to defence, is precisely this: facing reality head-on, recognising the threat, and having confidence in the West’s ability to offer alternatives to waving white flags.