Meloni: “Supporting Ukraine is the path to peace. Trump’s deal on Russian diesel is risky”

The choices Europe is called upon to make in order to defend its ability to remain competitive, secure and a leading player on the world stage are becoming ever more numerous and complex.

The war in Ukraine continues, with civilian targets increasingly being drawn into the conflict. Instability in the Middle East is having consequences that extend far beyond the region’s borders. Global economic competition is becoming ever more intense. Geopolitical tensions are affecting the security of our supply chains, the cost of fuel and the cost of living, and the ability of our businesses to compete. Added to this are hybrid threats, migratory pressures, growing instability and the consequent need to strengthen European security and defence.

These are, of course, different dossiers. But they have one thing in common: they remind us how events beyond our borders are having an ever-greater impact on our daily lives and are testing our nation’s ability to defend its prosperity and security. For this reason, in recent years, the Government has chosen to maintain a consistent and active presence on the international stage, guided by a clear policy. Because the national interest is defended by helping to shape the decisions that affect us, rather than merely suffering their consequences.

This applies particularly in Europe. It is in this spirit that Italy has been working in the run-up to the forthcoming European Council, and will address the main items on the agenda.

The European Council will take stock of the implementation of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ agenda and the progress made in deepening the single market, simplifying rules, reducing administrative burdens and speeding up planning and authorisation procedures.

These are objectives that Italy has long been pursuing. However, the issue that currently weighs most heavily on the competitiveness of our economy is another: the cost of energy.

We have said this many times: we cannot ask European businesses to compete with major global players whilst, at the same time, accepting that they structurally pay much more for energy than their competitors. Nor can we pursue the environmental transition at the expense of our industrial base. Decarbonisation cannot mean deindustrialisation. This is all the more true in the current geopolitical climate.

Tensions along key trade routes and within supply chains are affecting the security and cost of energy and fuel. Transport and insurance costs are rising and, ultimately, these increases are passed on to household bills, shopping baskets and business accounts.

Faced with such a scenario, no one can respond effectively on their own. The response must be coordinated and swift.

This is why we have been working to reach an agreement within the G7, which has provided for the release of a significant quantity of fuel onto the markets, partly to prevent the risk of a block on US exports, which would have had a severe impact on our economies.

But alongside the international response, we also need the courage to look at what we can do here in Europe. Starting with the most obvious thing: ensuring that rules devised in a context completely different from the one we are currently experiencing do not end up exacerbating the effects of the crises we are facing today.

Because our businesses are now facing increasingly aggressive global competition, and every additional cost that Europe imposes on itself is an advantage it hands to its competitors. And the time we have to correct our course is not infinite.

This is what Italy has focused its efforts on.

Last week, we organised a new round of discussions with the Heads of State and Government most committed to competitiveness, focusing on three priorities: energy, simplification and international trade.

It was precisely as a result of this coordination that, together with the German Chancellor and the Belgian Prime Minister, I sent three simple proposals to Brussels to facilitate and unlock investment: fast-track procedures for strategic projects, a genuine curb on excessive bureaucracy, and a drastic reduction in reporting requirements, particularly for SMEs.

At the same time, together with the Czech Republic, we have put forward a number of specific proposals, including some of a temporary nature, to reduce energy costs.

In Europe, a company that pollutes must buy a permit for every tonne of CO₂ it emits: this is the ETS system. However, these permits are traded on the market, and the price is therefore determined by market dynamics that, it must be said, have little to do with protecting the environment. When the price of ETS allowances rises, so too do production costs for steelworks, paper mills, cement works and ceramics factories. And that cost, ultimately, is passed on to the price of the goods we buy.

That is why we have set out in writing a number of specific proposals to reform the ETS system, so that the price of CO₂ reflects the real economy rather than the logic of finance. And we have called for a further postponement of ETS2, which from 2028 would impose new costs on households and businesses.

There is also a second problem, which has a direct impact on energy bills. The price of electricity is determined by the marginal price. This means that, in effect, the entire price is set by the last power station called upon to generate electricity – the one with the highest price – which is very often a gas-fired power station that pays into the ETS. Thus, the cost of CO₂ paid by that power station is passed on to the price of all electricity, including that produced from renewable sources.

This is a problem that particularly affects Italy, because, as you are well aware, our energy mix still relies heavily on gas. This vulnerability has deep-rooted causes, and we are working to address it – amongst other things, by increasing the share of renewables to an extent no previous government has achieved, and by paving the way for next-generation nuclear power – in order to build a system that is safer and less dependent on external sources.

However, these investments require time, and solutions are needed now. That is why I consider it very important to be able to outline a concrete plan that will deliver benefits in the short term.

At the European Council last March, we succeeded in including in the conclusions the possibility of adopting national, temporary and targeted measures to mitigate the various cost components of electricity generation. On that basis, the Commission undertook to work with us on the ‘Decreto Bollette’. The technical discussions have been intense and constructive and are leading us towards a solution compatible with European rules, which would enable us to implement our measure, thereby reducing the impact of gas-fired generation costs on the overall price of electricity.

There you have it: the result we’re interested in and are working towards. Not another line in the conclusions of a summit, but a lower utility bill for a family, one less cost for a business.

There have also been developments regarding the European Regulation on methane. The new requirements envisaged for importers could further restrict the available supply and put fresh pressure on prices. That is why we have called for a temporary suspension of certain obligations. When we raised the issue in recent months, the proposal seemed very difficult to push through. Now, however, the European Commission has announced its intention to postpone the entry into force of the regulation by one year. This is excellent news.

These two examples illustrate a principle we have emphasised from the outset: if a rule, when put to the test, produces consequences that were not foreseen, or exacerbates a crisis, that rule must be amended.

Because we are not here to defend the rules against reality. We are here to defend citizens against bad rules.

And it can be done. Thanks to Italy, it has happened on several occasions. It happened, for example, with the national safeguard clause, when Italy was the first to call for the flexibility provided for defence and security to be used to tackle the energy crisis as well; and although few believed it would happen, that proposal became a solution available to all Member States.

This is what we hope will also happen with the new proposals we have put forward regarding fiscal rules. As you know, I have written to President von der Leyen to ask for two things. Firstly, that the energy and inflationary shock be adequately taken into account when calculating the expenditure permitted under European rules. Secondly: that Member States be allowed to use at least part of the additional VAT revenue generated by rising prices to fund temporary, targeted measures to support households and businesses. Because it would be objectively difficult to explain to the public that, in order to respond to the shock, we cannot even use the increased revenue that the shock itself has generated.

These are common-sense proposals. We know it will not be easy to reach a consensus, but that is no reason for us to stop raising the issue forcefully.

Finally, there is the issue of critical raw materials. Lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earths are essential for the energy transition, the digital transition and defence. And today, Europe imports almost all of them, often from a single country. If we do not tackle this issue, we risk moving from one form of dependence to another.

This is also why Italy has put itself forward as a candidate to host one of Europe’s first strategic storage sites for these materials in Porto Marghera, an initiative that could become a European pilot project.

In short, the common thread linking all these initiatives is simple: Europe must once again place manufacturing capacity at the heart of its decision-making.

This is what we hope will also happen with the new proposals we have put forward regarding fiscal rules. As you know, I have written to President von der Leyen to ask for two things. Firstly, that the energy and inflationary shock be adequately taken into account when calculating the expenditure permitted under European rules. Secondly: that Member States be allowed to use at least part of the additional VAT revenue generated by rising prices to fund temporary, targeted measures to support households and businesses. Because it would objectively be difficult to explain to the public that, in order to respond to the shock, we cannot even use the increased revenue that the shock itself has generated.

These are common-sense proposals. We know it will not be easy to reach a consensus, but that does not mean we will not raise the issue forcefully.

Finally, there is the issue of critical raw materials. Lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earths are essential for the energy transition, the digital transition and defence. And today, Europe imports almost all of them, often from a single country. If we do not tackle this issue, we risk moving from one form of dependence to another.

This is also why Italy has put itself forward to host one of Europe’s first strategic storage sites for these materials in Porto Marghera, an initiative that could become a European pilot project.

In short, the common thread linking all these initiatives is simple: Europe must once again place manufacturing capacity at the heart of its decision-making.

Meanwhile, Russia has launched its new autumn campaign against Ukraine. Unable to make headway on the front line, Moscow has begun to strike ever harder at the civilian population: power stations, blocks of flats, hospitals, even buses carrying people to work, as in the horrific massacre in Kramatorsk.

It is a strategy through which Russia aims to break the Ukrainian people through terror, the cold and darkness, simply because it has failed to break them on the battlefield. The facts, after all, contradict the propaganda of the Kremlin and of those who spread that propaganda here in Italy too. Since the start of the year, Moscow has gained very little ground, and in September alone it lost much of what it had gained in recent months.

This stalemate did not come out of the blue: it was brought about by the courage of the Ukrainians and the support of the West, including Italy. And I continue to believe that this stalemate is the only effective tool we have to bring Russia to a serious negotiating table.

I am aware that there is a heated debate on this issue, even in this Chamber and among the political groups. I respect that and even understand it, because nobody in this Chamber wants war. We all want to achieve peace. The difference lies in how we think we can get there.

As I see it, support for Ukraine is not an alternative to peace: it is what makes peace possible. If the aggressor can force their opponent to surrender, why would they need to negotiate? Except that surrender is not peace; it is conquest.

If Ukraine were to cease defending itself tomorrow, as many hope or propose, peace would not ensue. We would be discussing the occupation of a European nation, and the return of Soviet-style imperialism that Europe experienced for half a century. Personally, I do not look back on those years with nostalgia; I do not look back on the Russian tanks that crushed the uprisings in Prague and Budapest; I do not look back on the Berlin Wall. No one can convince me that the surrender of those defending their freedom can be called peace. The peace we seek, and for which we are working—even at the cost of losing some public support—is a just peace, because only a just peace can endure and safeguard Europe and our interests.

So, the Government’s position remains unchanged. Support for Kyiv, with particular attention to the civilian population, pressure on Moscow and Euro-Atlantic unity remain the cornerstones of our approach.

In this context, we must also consider the agreement on Russian diesel announced last Friday by US President Donald Trump. It is a decision that I consider to be very risky.

Clearly, we all understand – and agree with – the need to keep energy prices in check, as they are a burden on households and businesses, including in Italy. But we must be aware that the surge in fuel prices is primarily due to the war in Iran, not the conflict in Ukraine. Therefore, the outcome of this decision is uncertain, whilst the risks are clear. Legitimisation for Moscow whilst its bombs continue to fall on Ukrainian cities, new revenue to fund the war, and an implicit weakening of the leverage provided by sanctions: these are factors we cannot ignore, and which contradict what Western states, including the United States, have done so far to push Putin to the negotiating table.

A different matter is a truce between the parties regarding power stations, which Italy supports, and we thank President Zelensky for having immediately declared Ukraine’s full willingness in this regard. We now expect Russia to do the same and to cease its attacks on Ukrainian power stations and energy facilities.

If, for example, France, Germany and Great Britain – in the famous E3 format – believe they can do better on their own than we could all do together, and this is the choice they have made so far, then at least let them do so on behalf of everyone and with an official mandate granted by everyone.

To be candid, I consider the question of who sits at which table to be of secondary importance. What matters to me is on whose behalf they are sitting at the table, and what they have to say. I am concerned that Europe should not be in disarray, should not leave itself open to those with an interest in fuelling divisions, and should speak with one voice. Because a Europe that is divided over formats presents a childish image of itself, and that is the only real gift we can give to Moscow. And as for gifts to Moscow, these days, enough have already been given.

That said, at such a complex time, when so many variables are beyond our control, there is at least one thing that depends on us: ensuring that Europe does not stand idly by. Because the terms of a peace that affects our continent – and therefore our security – cannot be dictated without us.

This is why I continue to call on the EU-27 to identify an authoritative figure, with a mandate from all, capable of bringing Europe’s voice to the table. And if no consensus can be reached on a particular name, we are also prepared to consider alternative solutions.

The point is that hybrid warfare is not declared and has no front line. It involves drones violating our partners’ airspace and flying over airports and bases in various European countries. It involves damaged undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, cyber-attacks on hospitals, ports and public administrations, and the sabotage of railway networks.

These are disinformation campaigns designed to divide public opinion, to discredit politicians regarded as enemies and to influence elections, going as far as outright manipulation of public perception. And the exploitation of migrants, who are pushed to the borders as tools of pressure.

A situation of this kind calls for a European response, and Italy will take to Brussels a number of priorities it considers fundamental. Protecting our critical infrastructure: here I am thinking of energy networks, submarine cables, ports, airports, and the underwater domain, in which Italy possesses outstanding expertise; supporting Italian industry in making a decisive contribution to anti-drone and anti-missile systems; reaffirming that the security of the Union’s borders is indivisible, and this means that whilst we help to support the eastern flank, we cannot accept the risk of losing sight of the southern flank.

Because defending oneself today does not simply mean having tanks. Defending oneself means a hospital that continues to provide care even whilst under a cyber-attack, a power station that does not shut down, an airport that does not grind to a halt because of a drone. Defending oneself is not about protecting an abstract idea of power. It is about protecting the everyday lives of citizens.

This leads to the question of resources. As I have already said, security and energy are two sides of the same coin. Without security, energy costs more. And without energy, there might be nothing left to defend.

This is why we requested – and secured – that the national safeguard clause could be used not only for defence expenditure, but also for the measures necessary to tackle the energy crisis.

The result is that, out of the maximum margin of 1.5 per cent of GDP provided for in the clause, Italy has decided to use 1.2 per cent, divided equally: 0.6 per cent for measures to tackle high energy costs – approximately 14 billion euros for vulnerable households and energy-intensive businesses – and a further 0.6 per cent for defence and security. In other words, given the circumstances, we have chosen not to utilise the full margin allocated to defence.

However, it should be noted that greater flexibility for defence and security essentially means additional resources beyond those permitted by European parameters. This is not money taken away from healthcare or education: if we did not spend it on defence, we would not be able to spend it on anything else.

Anyone who claims that greater security means fewer hospitals, with resources diverted from essential services by a government of warmongers, is knowingly spreading misinformation. This is all the more evident given that the very same people who are now accusing us from the opposition, when they were in government, approved – in the midst of a pandemic – an increase in military spending of around 15 billion euros. At that time, there was not even a war in Ukraine.

However, I wish to point out to our listeners, drawing on an argument put forward by Minister Crosetto, whom I would like to thank. For every 100 euros the State spends on defence, around 60 go towards paying the salaries of those who safeguard our security – nearly 280,000 men and women in uniform. Around 10 euros are needed to keep the facilities running on a day-to-day basis.

Around 30 per cent goes towards investment in an industrial sector that employs over 300,000 people – often highly skilled – across thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises throughout Italy. Those who talk of waste should also explain to those families that their jobs are unnecessary. And when we buy, what are we buying? Primarily tools to defend ourselves. Air defence, anti-drone systems, cyber-security, infrastructure protection. We are buying shields.

Finally, I would like to point out that security is also a prerequisite for prosperity. No one invests in a country that cannot protect its networks, its ports or its data. No business exports if trade routes are not secure. Furthermore, investing in security means safeguarding savings, jobs and innovation for the next twenty years. A country that does not invest in its own security is not saving. It is simply putting off paying the bill. And history teaches us that, in the end, that bill always turns out to be much more expensive.

A week ago, whilst I was in Split with the leaders of the MED9 nations, we marked the third anniversary of the tragic attack on 7 October 2023. A barbaric attack that plunged the entire region into chaos. It is important to remember this today. Any legitimate critical approach to the Israeli Government’s actions in the three years that followed cannot and must never make us forget what was the most horrific pogrom since the Holocaust, planned and carried out by Hamas.

Especially at a time when the spectre of anti-Semitism seems to be rearing its head in many countries. The security of the State of Israel, therefore, cannot be called into question. I continue to believe that it is necessary to maintain an open channel of dialogue with Israel. That said, however, we are concerned about the continuing Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, in Syria and in Gaza. And in the West Bank, we are witnessing intolerable pressure being exerted on the Palestinian population.

As we have written alongside France, Germany, the United Kingdom and other partners, Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal. And we strongly oppose those who support annexation and the forced displacement of the Palestinian population.

Faced with this situation, Europe must reclaim the role it is capable of playing. The window of opportunity to do so will inevitably open with the formation of the new Israeli government, regardless of who wins the elections. That will be the moment to call for actions capable of reversing the downward spiral that has been ongoing for far too long and, looking ahead, to reopen a political path towards peace.

It will take time, we know. But we are equally aware that if, over the coming months, we witness endless expansion of settlements in the West Bank, the collapse of the Palestinian Authority or a resurgence of violence in Gaza or in the West Bank itself, the two-state solution will become impossible. And that is an outcome we cannot afford.

These include the transfer to the Palestinian Authority of tax revenues currently withheld by Israel, and the freeze on the E1 settlement, on which we have already expressed our views alongside our main European partners.

The situation in Gaza remains dire. More aid is needed, and it is needed urgently. A political initiative is also required to ascertain whether Hamas is genuinely prepared to lay down its arms. This would be the turning point we need, and it would pave the way for reconstruction, in the interests – first and foremost – of the civilian population.

We continue, therefore, to believe in and work towards a genuine peace between Israel and Lebanon. As you know, Italy has hosted several rounds of negotiations and we are ready to do so again. I am convinced that the Lebanese leadership is genuinely prepared to sign a just and lasting peace with Israel. And we are ready to support them, including through a Franco-Italian initiative for the post-UNIFIL period, to equip the Lebanese armed forces with the capabilities necessary to assert Lebanon’s sovereignty over its entire territory.

Starting with freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is of vital interest to Europe. The restrictions and attacks in these two straits have had a direct impact on the lives of our citizens, starting with energy prices.

The Government has committed to mitigating the effects and will continue to do so using every means at its disposal, but a lasting solution necessarily involves restoring full freedom of navigation: without tolls and without discriminatory restrictions.

This is why I believe Europe must take a leading role, starting with the strengthening of Operation Aspides in the Red Sea, which Italy currently leads and which relies largely on the contribution of just a handful of nations. We need more ships, and we need them now.

We must also deepen our partnership with the Gulf States. Europe and the Gulf are two regions linked by increasingly close ties, which require rules and stability in order to prosper. Italy has made defence capabilities available to those nations in the region that have requested them, to protect themselves against unjustified attacks by Iran and its allies.

These attacks, which in recent days have seen a further escalation by the Houthis against Saudi energy infrastructure, are ones we strongly condemn.

This means forging new links between Europe, the Gulf and Asia, starting with the IMEC corridor; providing better protection for ports, undersea cables and energy infrastructure; and diversifying routes and suppliers. Here too, Italy, together with its businesses, is playing its part. Now Europe must do the same.

It is a complex and important matter, because the EU budget is not merely an accounting exercise. It is the tool through which we actually decide what the priorities for the future are and how many resources we are prepared to make available for those priorities.

In recent months, we have already achieved a number of concrete results compared with the Commission’s original proposal. Member States will play a more decisive role in managing the new instruments: decisions on how to use the resources will not be taken solely in Brussels. The Common Agricultural Policy and fisheries policy will retain their own identities and safeguards, because farmers and fishermen cannot simply become just another item in an indistinct fund. On the rule of law, we have secured clearer and more objective rules to prevent it from being exploited for political ends. The new European Competitiveness Fund will provide greater safeguards for small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of our economy. And governments will have a greater say in defining the priorities of the Union’s external action.

These are significant results, but the negotiations are still a long way from being concluded. In fact, we are now entering the most delicate phase: that of negotiating the actual size of the budget and where to find the necessary resources.

We are not opposed to this objective on principle, but it must be clear that the deadline cannot take precedence over the content. We will not sign an unfavourable agreement simply to meet a deadline. We will only sign an agreement when it is in Italy’s best interests.

And what does this mean, in practical terms? First and foremost, it means drawing up a budget that provides clear and concrete answers. It means adequately funding the new priorities that we all claim to regard as strategic, without sacrificing the policies that form one of the cornerstones of the European project.

Let me make this very clear: Italy will not accept a budget that scales back the Common Agricultural Policy, fisheries and cohesion. Agriculture and fisheries are central to our food security, which is an essential component of Europe’s strategic autonomy.

Cohesion concerns the single market’s ability to function without leaving entire regions behind, and consequently weakening overall growth as well. And so, in my view, there is no contradiction between traditional policies and new priorities. On the contrary: there can be no security without food security, and there can be no true competitiveness without equal dignity amongst regions.

We are talking about a cut of 108 billion compared with the June proposal and over 140 billion compared with the Commission’s original proposal.

Despite such substantial cuts, the overall resources allocated to national and regional plans – including the CAP and Cohesion Policy – have been preserved. This is a significant achievement, by no means a foregone conclusion, to which the joint letter from the 17 Member States of the ‘Friends of Cohesion’ made a decisive contribution – another initiative launched at Italy’s instigation, this time in conjunction with Romania.

And to continue working along these lines, together with Romania we will host a new meeting of the group on the sidelines of the forthcoming European Council. It will be an opportunity to take stock of the negotiations and reaffirm a common position ahead of the decisive phase.

Here, I believe the question we should start with is not how large the budget should be, but what Europe considers essential in the coming years. First we define the objectives, then we find a way to fund them. Not the other way round.

That said, we have a number of reservations regarding the new own resources proposed by the Commission, but we are prepared to work on the basis of a clear principle: to ease the burden on national budgets as much as possible, without imposing new taxes on European citizens and businesses.

We believe that we can and should also consider a more gradual repayment of the debt incurred for Next Generation EU, so that these repayments do not constrain other European policies precisely in the years when greater investment is needed.

And in general, I believe that, in order to fund priorities that are strategic for all of us, no option should be ruled out from the outset.

Firstly, this is our overall position. The Irish Presidency’s proposal leaves the criteria for the allocation of resources essentially unchanged, and these continue to penalise our country. We cannot accept that Italy should contribute more to the European budget whilst, at the same time, receiving less in return. It is simply a matter of fairness.

The second concerns the so-called rebates – the discounts on contributions enjoyed by certain Member States – on which the new proposal makes no headway whatsoever. I find it difficult to explain why precisely those who are calling for the budget to be ‘modernised’ – that is, reduced – should insist on retaining privileges that originated in an earlier phase of European integration.

If modernisation is to take place, it must apply to everyone. We cannot expect sacrifices to be European, whilst privileges remain national.

The third may seem technical, but it says a great deal about how Europe works. It is the principle that European funds cannot finance activities that cause significant harm to the environment. A principle that can be considered fair. But the Commission’s initial drafts of the implementing rules risk turning it into the automatic exclusion of entire sectors – precisely what governments had decided to avoid.

We cannot ask a steelworks to invest billions in the transition, make it pay CO₂ allowances, and then tell it that, precisely because it is a steelworks, it cannot access European funds for decarbonisation. Nor can we say we want to strengthen energy security and then automatically exclude the infrastructure needed to ensure this process.

It should also be noted that government decisions are not drafts that the bureaucracy can amend at will. This trend whereby Heads of State and Heads of Government make decisions that are then systematically undermined by bureaucratic rules is unacceptable and must be rectified.

Our overall assessment of the package will also depend on how these issues are resolved. However, as mentioned, we will have an opportunity to revisit this matter.

Only a reunified Europe, backed by a solid political consensus, can achieve the critical mass needed to remain competitive, influential and secure.

Starting with the Western Balkans. Naturally, each path has its own characteristics, its own timetable and its own conditions. But the political outlook is the same: to firmly consolidate the European anchorage of nations that are part of our history.

We support enlargement based on the principle of merit and mutual responsibility. It is up to the candidate countries to carry out the necessary reforms and gradually align themselves with European rules. It is, however, up to the Union to recognise, without delay, those results through concrete progress. And that is why, in the short term, our priority is to strongly support the progress of Montenegro and Albania in this process. Their success would have significance far beyond their own – and our own – borders. It would send a message to the entire region that the accession process is real, that reforms are rewarded, and that when a candidate country plays its part, the Union is capable of playing its own.

I have pointed out on many occasions in this Chamber how the European approach to this issue has changed significantly in recent years.

At first, many considered it impossible that issues such as focusing on preventing departures rather than managing arrivals, strengthening the external dimension, building partnerships with countries of origin and transit, making returns more effective and developing innovative solutions could become a regular feature of the European debate. But that is precisely what has happened. And this change in approach, to which Italy has made a decisive contribution, is yielding concrete results.

It is not the Government that says so. It is the Frontex data. In two years, irregular crossings of the EU’s external borders have more than halved.

And this year the decline continues: down 35 per cent in the first eight months compared with last year. On the central Mediterranean route, which involves Italy, arrivals have fallen by more than half.

The problem has not been resolved; this much is clear. Yet these figures underscore a straightforward reality: an alternative to an open-door policy has always existed. For years, the decision was simply not to pursue it.

We intend to continue along the path we have set out on, without letting our guard down. Not least because the events in Ceuta at the end of July clearly demonstrated just how quickly situations of exceptional pressure can arise at the external borders.

In light of those events, as you know, Italy has decided to temporarily reintroduce internal air and sea border controls with Spain, based on a security assessment. The ensuing controversy, particularly from certain opposition parties, has been described as surreal, as these parties appear more concerned with defending the Spanish government than with Italian security and borders.

I would point out that the Schengen Code expressly provides for the possibility of temporarily reintroducing internal border controls for reasons of public order or security. In fact, this is a measure that is used regularly: since 2006, Member States have invoked it almost five hundred times, and in over thirty cases the controls have directly affected Italy. France, for example, has maintained border controls with us for over ten years.

We do not accept that defending borders is a right for others but a fault when it comes to Italy.

Ceuta has also taught us something else: a border crisis does not always arise of its own accord. Sometimes it is manufactured. Smugglers organise it, social media amplifies it, and disinformation fuels it.

Those who use desperate people as a means of exerting pressure on our borders are not merely breaching a frontier. They are attacking Europe. And Europe must equip itself with the tools to respond.

Also in the wake of the events in Ceuta, on 1 August, Italy, together with Denmark, initiated a letter signed by 22 out of 27 European Heads of State and Government, in which we called for greater protection of external borders, a more decisive crackdown on trafficking networks, more repatriations and an improved ability to anticipate and respond to similar situations.

And we have called for a serious approach to the factors driving migration, which we believe also include large-scale regularisation. Naturally, each Member State retains its own powers and takes its own decisions. But we live in an integrated area, with freedom of movement and common borders. And what one state decides on its own territory does not necessarily remain confined to that territory: it can have repercussions on all the others, and on the very stability of the Schengen Area.

Then there are the repatriations. For years in Europe, a deportation order has very often remained nothing more than a piece of paper. Today we have more effective tools, thanks in part to the new European rules, and the results are clear: this year, repatriations have reached their highest level ever recorded for the same period, and they continue to rise. I would like to thank Minister Piantedosi and all those who work every day to achieve this result. Because the message must be clear: anyone who enters Italy illegally cannot expect to stay here.

And then there is the work carried out along the entire route. Thanks to collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration and with Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, over the last two years around 65,000 migrants have voluntarily returned to their countries of origin, before even attempting to cross the Mediterranean. That is 65,000 people who have not entrusted their lives to people smugglers.

But for this model to work even better, we need the greatest possible cooperation from third countries. And when this cooperation is lacking, Europe must use every lever at its disposal: diplomacy, cooperation, trade and visas. Because anyone who wishes to be our partner cannot treat repatriation as a separate issue.

The same applies to innovative solutions. Italy has led the way with its centres in Albania, and today return hubs in third countries are provided for under European legislation, with many Member States wishing to follow this path. We must now move on to implementation. The EU must support those wishing to launch pilot projects, providing resources, expertise and means, in full compliance with European and international law. And those resources must also be included in the next EU budget.

The matter will also be discussed on the sidelines of the European Council, during the customary working breakfast on innovative solutions to migration issues, which, as always, has been organised together with Denmark and the Netherlands.

We live in a world where security, prosperity and many of the balances we have taken for granted for years can no longer be taken for granted. And Europe must decide how to deal with this. It can continue to draw up rules as if nothing had changed. Or it can face reality for what it is, and equip itself with the tools to defend its economy, its security and its freedom.

It is this Europe that we are working towards. It is an Europe capable of reconciling the energy transition with industry, traditional policies with new priorities, cooperation with partners with the defence of its borders. A pragmatic Europe, unafraid to adjust its course when circumstances change. A Europe that focuses its strength on the major challenges that no single nation can tackle alone, and knows when to step aside where nations are better off acting independently. A Europe that takes a strong stance on major issues, and a low-key one on everything else.

For years we were told that, to count for something in Europe, Italy had to give up defending its own interests. We have proved the opposite. Because a strong Europe needs strong nations. And we can work towards a more solid and credible Europe without ever, not even for a minute, ceasing to defend Italy with pride

It is with this sense of pride that I shall travel to Brussels. With the same determination as the millions of Italians who, every day, work, produce, innovate and keep this nation going. Because we owe them a Europe that protects them, rather than hindering them. And I want to tell them that, wherever their future is decided, Italy will be there to make its voice heard.