Bettini’s confused argument on NATO, Ukraine and Russia

Goffredo Bettini’s reflections are always a reliable barometer of political movements on the left. The editor of Rinascita and an influential thinker within the PD, in a letter to Corriere della Sera, identifies the crux of the progressive alliance: “The broad coalition seems paralysed on the issue of Ukraine,” he writes. It is the seemingly insurmountable obstacle. And so he offers the solution, which is precisely “to break free from the pressing dilemma of ‘arms yes or arms no’” – not least because, as it stands, there would be no agreement – in order to offer the world a ‘prospect’ that brings Europe, Russia and Ukraine into alignment through a ‘ceasefire along the front line’, a ‘demilitarised zone’ guaranteed by ‘neutral forces’ under the UN flag, and ‘yes to Ukraine joining the European Union, but no to NATO’.

The proposal, as is clear from the opening lines of the letter, is obviously intended to bring the M5S and the PD into agreement on an ambiguous formula. Whether this is realistic and politically feasible is entirely secondary and irrelevant. But Bettini’s letter is interesting because it provides some insights into the recent past of the Italian left and, above all, its possible near future. Starting with NATO.

Bettini writes that Europe has fuelled “the climate of war”, demonised Vladimir Putin, “exaggerated the danger of a Russian attack” and “completely ignored the reasons that led to the conflict”. Among these is, to evoke a famous and unfortunate metaphor, that of having barked at Russia’s doorstep: Europe “failed to grasp the grave mistake of bringing NATO to Russia’s borders”, he writes. It was this provocation, as Vladimir Putin has said on numerous occasions, that triggered Russia’s reaction.

Since NATO’s enlargement to include new member states must necessarily be decided unanimously, one wonders who could have prevented this bellicose decision to welcome the new, young democracies of the East – which for decades had been crushed under the Soviet yoke – under the Atlantic umbrella. The Italian centre-left, for example. The first three former communist countries – one of which borders Russia – to be invited to join NATO were Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 1997. The Prodi government was in power at the time and, naturally, in favour. Membership was formalised in 1999 under the D’Alema government (with Sergio Mattarella as Deputy Prime Minister), the first to be led by a post-communist. That same government, a few weeks after NATO’s eastward enlargement, took part in the Alliance’s military mission during the Kosovo war, bombing Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. For Putin, who had been Prime Minister for only a few months at the time, that intervention was the first act of hostility and aggression toward Russia.

The other enlargement, involving seven countries from the former Soviet bloc – including the three Baltic republics bordering Russia – took place in 2004: the Berlusconi government was in power at the time, but the centre-left voted in favour of the law ratifying accession (with the exception of a few MPs from Rifondazione Comunista). The most recent accession to NATO by a country bordering Russia is that of Finland, which, following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, decided to abandon its traditional position of neutrality: its accession was formalised in 2023, after the vetoes by Erdogan’s Turkey and Orbán’s Hungary had been overcome. In Italy, the Draghi government – of which the PD was a part – was in power and was, of course, in favour of Finland’s accession.

In the midst of this lies another, very deep rift in relations between the West and Russia: the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The PD was in opposition at the time, but was far more convinced than the Berlusconi government of the need to intervene to stop Gaddafi. That was the position of the President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, but also of the PD leadership, from Secretary Bersani downwards. “It’s not as though the ‘reset’ has ended now because of Crimea. I think it ended even earlier, immediately after the events in Libya,” said Putin in 2014, following the first invasion of Ukraine, regarding relations with the United States and the West.

Therefore, when Bettini says that NATO’s expansion towards Russia was a “very serious mistake”, not only does he agree with Putin, but he also throws the last thirty years of the Italian centre-left’s foreign policy overboard. So much for the past. As for the future, however, Bettini’s line is at times surreal. He starts from the premise that a ‘common European defence’ is needed rather than national rearmament; he then says that a ‘dialogue’ must be initiated with Putin, which, however, ‘can never take place unless the European alliance of the “willing” is dismantled’ – an alliance which, he goes so far as to claim, ‘wants another war’.

The point is that the ‘coalition of the willing’ comprises around 40 countries, almost all of which are members of the European Union and, more broadly, part of Europe (including the United Kingdom and Norway): how can a ‘common European defence’ be built if the union of countries that already shares a common vision on Ukraine and European security more generally is dismantled? Bettini then says that ‘a united Europe’ should put forward a peace proposal. But if he wants to dismantle the coalition of the willing – which embodies this unity – with whom does he intend to make a different proposal? Is he waiting for governments to change in Germany, the UK, France and Spain? Perhaps with the AfD, Farage, Le Pen, Vox (and even Vannacci?) – all parties whose positions on Ukraine are closer to those of Bettini and Conte than to those of Meloni and the ‘coalition of the willing’ – might it be possible to put forward an offer at the expense of the Ukrainians that would please Putin?

Bettini’s argument is internally consistent, even if it appears to make little strategic sense. What truly matters, according to this logic, is not the future of Ukraine or the defence of Europe, but rather reaching any sort of agreement with Conte – and possibly with Putin – in order to form a government. This is the same reason why a section of the post-communist left has, over the past thirty years, supported NATO’s decisions that it now renounces.