To win the 2027 elections, the PD is staking everything on Meloni’s accountability

Just how ‘responsible’ is Giorgia Meloni? This is the question being asked by international markets and investors in relation to the latest Budget Bill ahead of the elections. It is also being asked in Europe and in Western chancelleries regarding defence spending and the pro-Ukraine stance, which risks wavering ahead of the vote. But, above all, the centre-left is asking this very question, as it bases a large part of its chances of victory in the upcoming elections on Meloni’s governing style. Because the paradox is something like this. On the one hand, the centre-left parties have decided to set aside certain fundamental political issues in order to broaden the coalition as much as possible. On the other hand, they are banking on the ruling right-wing government being strict in drawing its red lines, thereby keeping Roberto Vannacci’s far right out of the coalition.

The PD, M5S, AVS, IV, +E and other groups such as Progetto Civico (led by Onorato) and Più Uno (led by Ruffini) are clear on one point: following the experience of 2022, when the current centre-left presented itself to voters as split into three factions, thereby handing victory to the centre-right, unity is not only the most important thing but the only thing that matters. Although the scope of the coalition has not yet been defined – such as how many parties it will comprise, who the prime ministerial candidate will be, and what the programme will entail – it is certain that they will all stand united. The issue of Ukraine – and therefore whether or not to continue military aid to Kyiv, with Conte said to be certain it should not and Schlein convinced it should – is not, however, considered a decisive factor. An agreement will be reached, a compromise, a formula vague enough to mean that weapons may or may not be sent.

When it comes to economic policy, the deficit is what unites all the parties and their wish lists. Giuseppe Conte wants to give €15,000 to everyone turning 18, Elly Schlein wants to raise healthcare spending to 7 per cent of GDP, Matteo Renzi wants to allocate 2 per cent of GDP to increase salaries, and AVS wants to halt the rise in the state pension age. There is something for everyone. However, no indication is given as to how these measures will be funded: there is no agreement on a wealth tax; some believe the ‘tax on windfall profits’ can finance the entire wish list; others fall back on the usual ‘crackdown on tax evasion’; and still others are pinning their hopes on artificial intelligence (ChatGPT will find the money).

Although we have never seen a centre-left so fragmented – for even in the days of Romano Prodi’s motley Union, there were certainties regarding leadership, budgetary policy and international positioning (those dissenting on Afghanistan were numerically a tiny minority) – this undefined coalition has a good chance of prevailing. According to the majority of opinion polls, this ‘Campo largo’ is a few points ahead of the centre-right led by Meloni, Salvini, Tajani and Lupi (the latest Ipsos poll for Corriere della Sera puts the centre-left at 42.7 per cent against the centre-right’s 40.2 per cent).

However, this advantage holds only if the centre-right leaves Futuro Nazionale out in the cold. Otherwise, with Vannacci in the coalition, the centre-right takes the lead. The progressive camp therefore bases its strategy on a certain degree of ‘irresponsibility’: for now, let’s all join forces to win, and then, once in government, we’ll decide what to do; and on the expectation that, conversely, Meloni will be very ‘responsible’, prioritising the common good (by avoiding electoral manoeuvres that would harm public finances) and her own convictions (by avoiding an alliance with those who wish to abandon Ukraine to Putin) over the temptation to bring Vannacci on board simply to gain one more vote than their opponents.