Instructions (including from the left) for a European revolution. A preview of Paolo Gentiloni’s book

We are publishing a few pages from Paolo Gentiloni’s book, "Diventare una potenza. Istruzioni per una rivoluzione europea" (Rizzoli), which will be available in bookshops from tomorrow. The former Prime Minister will present the book on Wednesday in Milan, at ISPI, and on Thursday 24th in Rome, at the Marco Besso Foundation.

Europe, therefore, has become the battleground for a political clash that is increasingly influential for the future of our democracies. But the awareness of what is at stake differs greatly between the two opposing camps. Europe’s opponents are generally in the minority, but they share at least three characteristics. Firstly, they are very vocal and determined. In many countries, the anti-European message resonates when it comes to the economy, climate change, migration or bureaucratic obstacles: Brussels is to blame.

Secondly, anti-EU parties and movements have shown themselves capable of adapting their strategies as the situation evolves. Ten years after Brexit, almost none of the Union’s opponents openly promote ‘exit’ strategies; rather, the aim has become to weaken and erode the Union from within, asserting the role of nation states at the expense of any level of integration.

The third characteristic is that anti-EU nationalists are coordinating their efforts around the common goal of dismantling the European project. This is surprising, given that, in theory, nationalism should preclude cooperation between different countries: if you advocate ‘America First’, you are not on the same wavelength as those promoting ‘La France d’abord’, ‘Deutschland zuerst’ or their equivalents. Yet here, it is against an ‘external’ enemy – Brussels – that each group’s nationalism is directed, and so the apparent paradox of an international alliance of sovereigntists seems to materialise. This is further aided by the American MAGA movement, which has long been committed to the goal of dismantling the EU.

And what of Europe’s friends? Of course, there are the blue-and-starred flags symbolising European aspirations flying in Tbilisi or on Maidan Square, but mobilisation in support of Europe within EU member states is rather rare. And in public discourse, even amongst EU supporters, criticism tends to prevail regarding the Union’s limitations, unfinished business and shortcomings. Everyone would like it to be different from what it is. A triumph of the European critical spirit of which we could be proud, were it not for the fact that this extraordinary project, which has taken shape over the last seventy years, is anything but a foregone conclusion. As well as being debated, it should be defended.

The risk, in short, is that in the face of attacks from sovereignist nationalism, few will take responsibility for standing by the European Union as such. Supporting it not because they agree with its decisions or its institutional structure, but simply because they want to protect it. Because, to echo a controversial nineteenth-century motto, ‘Right or wrong, my Europe’.

Those who oppose the EU on a daily basis, or even advocate leaving the euro, pretend not to realise that, without the euro, a country like Italy – with 137 per cent public debt and as a major importer of gas and oil – would have faced soaring energy and mortgage costs, a surge in inflation and financial instability. In the medium term, it would face severe sacrifices simply to remain afloat. (…)

Anyone who speaks out against alleged European rearmament deserves respect if they are a staunch pacifist. If, however, they believe we can defend ourselves by fortifying our national borders, they are ignoring the reality of the world. And if they envisage armed conflict between European ‘nations’ pitted against one another, they are forgetting several centuries of war in our continent’s history. Peace is the very reason for the Union’s existence. And our ability to contribute to peace throughout the world depends on a common European defence.

In short, defending Europe today means treating its enemies for what they are: enemies of the homeland. They wave the Italian tricolour whilst working against Italian interests.

If the European Union is to fulfil its role, it cannot be left to its own devices; it must not run the risk of being surrounded by a minority of vociferous opponents and of not being defended by a large majority of reluctant supporters. It cannot be a target. It must become a major political player. A power.

And what about the left?

The dividing line between those for and against Europe is therefore becoming increasingly important and decisive, but it does not erase the more traditional division between right and left. Rather, it overlaps with it, forcing the European left to make a choice.

As Foreign Secretary, Prime Minister and Commissioner, I attended dozens of European socialist (and democratic) summits, which almost always took place an hour before European Council meetings. Those summits had mixed fortunes, linked to the political climate in the various countries, but they nevertheless saw the attendance of up to ten prime ministers from different countries, including, at various times, Germany, France, Italy and Spain.

During those meetings, I observed that within the Socialist camp, positions on the fundamental decisions to be taken are far from uniform. Even within the other major European political family – the People’s Party – there is no shortage of differing views, but these are managed by a strong (German) leadership. The same cannot be said of the Socialist camp. And so, for example, when it comes to the economy, bringing the positions of the Italian Democrats and the Scandinavian Socialists closer together is a real challenge; at best, the differences can be minimised.

Although they hold differing positions, at heart European socialists are all grappling with the same problem: how to tackle the veritable genetic mutation that has caused them to lose support amongst workers and marginalised working-class groups, transforming them into parties of the urban middle class, pensioners and minorities campaigning for rights.

The answers are not straightforward; similar problems are facing progressives all over the world, starting with the American Democrats. The starting point, however, should be that social dimension which acts as the glue holding the socialist family together. A sort of comfort zone – no one is ever opposed to the ‘pillar of social rights’ – which, in practice, has often turned into a sort of Indian reservation. When socialists protest, the standard response is to add a few references to social rights and a few appointments in that sector—much like entrusting the Greens with the Environment Ministry in coalition governments.

A very different ambition is needed. And it is needed now, given that the lower social classes’ infatuation with the right could soon wane due to a total lack of answers. No matter how hard you try to compensate for this with identity politics, if you have no economic solutions to offer the ‘forgotten men’, sooner or later they will abandon you.

The enormous challenge lies in redesigning one of the pillars of the European model: the welfare state. And it is precisely the Left – which in many countries was its architect – that could rise to this challenge. The social landscape has changed completely from the one in which European welfare systems took shape, and it is no longer enough simply to aim to protect citizens from poverty and illness. There are numerous new questions to be answered: how to ensure insurance cover linked to the worker rather than the workplace; how to protect workers on digital platforms; how to introduce universal basic income schemes at a European level; how to transform healthcare systems towards home care and support for those who are not self-sufficient; and how to extend the concept of universal services to public transport and social housing. In short, how do we move away from a traditional ‘cradle-to-grave’ model – based on stable families and jobs, and on rapid economic growth – and adapt it to an era of instability, slow growth, longevity and artificial intelligence? A reimagined welfare system should also be based on the aim of making some of its foundations mandatory across Europe: the social dimension will remain predominantly national; we will not have a ‘European’ minimum wage; but on certain essential points, common criteria and shared tools are needed.