What remains of Padania thirty years on

Thirty years ago today, Umberto Bossi proclaimed in Venice that ‘Padania is an independent and sovereign federal republic’. This marked the culmination of a demonstration that had begun two days earlier on the slopes of Mount Monviso, bringing together around a million people along the course of the River Po. The message that emerged was more than just a mere show of political strength: it was the expression of a pre-political sentiment, born of real problems. For a time, the Lega knew how to interpret these. Today, it seems to have given up on doing so. What remains of that experience?

With hindsight, what stands out most is the folkloric aspect: the ampoule containing water from the River Po, a declaration of independence modelled on the American one of 1776, the inevitable militant with a helmet and horns, and so on. Yet it was not merely folklore. Bossi had realised that, to forge an identity, symbols were needed. That is why the ‘Senatùr’ had adopted the colour green. A government of Padania had been presented in Venice. A few months later, the Lega had organised elections for the Padanian Parliament, in which, amongst others, the Radical Benedetto Della Vedova took part. Then came the Green Shirts. The initiative eventually spiralled out of control: on 8 May 1997, the Serenissimi drove their tanko into St Mark’s Square in Venice. They were immediately arrested, but the League – driven more by the pressure of its militants than by the leader’s wishes – rallied round them (including a large demonstration outside the prison in Modena where they were being held).

It was precisely the power of those symbols that sparked a reaction from those who, on the contrary, saw them as a subversive act. Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale organised counter-demonstrations. The centre-left rediscovered ‘the Fatherland’ and ‘the Nation’, with the customary capital letters. Giorgio Napolitano, at the time Minister of the Interior in the first Prodi government, made no secret of his fears. On 18 September 1996, the Digos raided the headquarters in Via Bellerio, illegally searching Roberto Maroni’s office and injuring him. According to opinion polls, a substantial minority of northern Italians – between 20 and 25 per cent – openly supported independence. A further 50 per cent, whilst not believing that a break with national unity was useful or necessary, were calling for far-reaching forms of federalism and autonomy.

It is precisely this aspect that lends today’s anniversary an importance that transcends the limited consequences of the Lega’s brief secessionist phase. The causes that led to that uprising have neither been addressed nor, let alone, resolved. Unlike other ‘small homelands’, Padania – whilst sharing certain cultural traits – was not a product of history; it was primarily a product of the economy. On the one hand, the North felt unfairly exploited from a fiscal point of view: recent data on the so-called ‘fiscal residue’ are not available, but according to the latest estimates from the Bank of Italy, in 2019 the difference between what the central and northern regions paid in taxes and what they received in return amounted to 95.9 billion euros, whilst the South and the islands had a surplus of 64.2 billion. On the other hand, Italy imposed a second, less obvious tax, due to the inefficiency of public services and the proliferation of contradictory rules. According to an estimate by Confesercenti, bureaucratic burdens impose a cost on small and medium-sized enterprises equivalent to 3 per cent of their turnover; if we had better-drafted laws, according to a study by economists Tommaso Giommoni, Luigi Guiso, Claudio Michelacci and Massimo Morelli, Italy’s GDP would be 5 percentage points higher.

In light of these figures, it is difficult to deny that the Lega was addressing a real problem. Bossi’s strategy in 1996 was extreme and, ultimately, largely ineffective: yet in the meantime, far from being resolved, the problem has worsened. At least three major changes have taken place: one institutional, one economic and one political. The institutional difference is that the winds of change in the 1990s brought about some reforms; unfortunately, the result has been disappointing. The most far-reaching measure was the 2001 reform of Title V of the Constitution, pushed for by the centre-left, from which the current proposals for differentiated autonomy stem. In practice, it has created confusion over certain areas of competence without truly revising the balance of powers and, above all, without making the regions fiscally accountable.

However, an even more significant change was underway. In the second half of the 1990s, the European Union was taking its first steps toward its current form, a development that lent itself to various interpretations. Within the Lega – and around it, in a cultural ferment that has never been repeated, either there or elsewhere – two perspectives clashed: according to some, European integration represented an opportunity, not only because of the removal of trade barriers, but also because it offered a framework of stability within which it would be possible to incorporate demands for autonomy (this was the same strategy as that of the Catalan independence movement). The ‘liberal League members’ were critical of the EU’s bureaucratisation, but regarded the creation of the single market as strategic. At the opposite extreme, however, were militants and intellectuals who were radically anti-European; as nationalists, they were hostile to the market. For a certain period, the EU’s progress did indeed provide economic breathing space for the North, as we shall see shortly. However, politically, within the League, this second perspective prevailed. Consequently, the cultural battle (“Italians first”) took precedence over the economic one (“Further from Rome, closer to Europe”), and the political shift to the right supplanted geographical affiliation with the North.

Meanwhile, the global economy was also undergoing change. Globalisation and the end of competitive devaluations had triggered a process of ‘creative destruction’, the epicentre of which lay in the North. Many businesses went bankrupt; many others invested and innovated, thereby gaining ever more ground in foreign markets: today, the Italian economy is underpinned by a segment of exporting firms, the majority of which are based in the North. Lombardy alone accounts for over a quarter of national exports; if we also include Veneto, Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna and Liguria, the figure rises to almost two-thirds of the total. This extraordinary growth is the result of progressive specialisation in production and a shift towards market segments characterised by a high degree of innovation. However, the new reality and increasingly fierce global competition make a tax burden that is among the highest in Europe – coupled with often inefficient public services – even more unsustainable, as it limits businesses’ ability to respond to shocks. According to an analysis by Itinerari Previdenziali, for example, the North, which accounts for 46.5 per cent of the population, pays 56.7 per cent of personal income tax (Irpef). The EU itself, particularly since the Covid-19 pandemic, has progressively stepped up its regulatory output, whilst pursuing objectives of economic transformation (rather than mere integration). Consequently, Brussels’ over-regulation, Italian inefficiency and high taxation reinforce one another.

So, politically too, everything has changed. The Lega has lost its leading position and the party with the most votes in the North is Fratelli d’Italia, which is now claiming the presidency of the Lombardy Region. After all, this reversal is also the result of the redefinition of the Lega’s mission: Via Bellerio has abandoned its ambition to act as a regional trade union. The fact that there is now renewed talk of the ‘Northern Question’ therefore appears to be a ploy for internal positioning. As Gianna Gancia has noted, very few voices were raised when the totems of the Bossi era were torn down one after the other: the League is no longer the ‘North’, let alone ‘for the independence of Padania’; the ‘Sun of the Alps’ has vanished from its emblem and flags; even the green has been supplanted by a far more grim colour scheme. Reconnecting with that legacy today is extremely difficult.

Nevertheless, the reasons for the North’s discontent in the 1990s have grown more pronounced. The crisis of globalisation and the EU’s regulatory drift make the role of the regions even more crucial. Some are beginning to realise this: Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna and Liguria have reached an agreement on industrial policy, recognising that they share common needs (Guido Fanti, the first president of Emilia-Romagna, was already saying this in the 1970s, when he was the first to use the term ‘Padania’ in a political sense). Yet, to paraphrase the Supreme Poet, it is a generous impulse without a mad dream: it is the most that can be achieved within the current institutional framework, but it completely lacks that broad political vision which, thirty years ago, was able to transform an economic demand into a mass mobilisation. It is significant, in this regard, that the country’s leading economic and financial daily – and the official publication of Confindustria – has found no space to report on the initiative.

For reasons different from those of the past, the regional or macro-regional dimension is once again able to tap into a widespread need and translate it into a political proposal. The triumph of the far right suggests that voters do not trust Brussels with any more power (partly because they are disillusioned by the way that power has been exercised so far). Yet the far right, from the AfD to General Vannacci, appears incapable of offering a coherent and well-founded economic response because it fails to break free from the national dimension (and thus from its natural hostility towards any European experiment). Conversely, a renewed leading role for the regions can express a new vitality and strike a balance with Europe. As Gianfranco Miglio prophetically wrote, the nation state appears woefully inadequate at balancing the needs of the local area with global challenges: to establish a new balance of powers, an intermediate level is needed – such as the macro-regional level – which is sufficiently close to the electorate yet also large enough to play a role in a broader context. The coordination scheme that has just been announced is the best that can be achieved under the current rules; but it is also, clearly, inadequate to meet the challenge.

That is why the lesson of 15 September 1996 must not only not be forgotten, but deserves to be revisited. That demonstration was more than just a party initiative; for this reason, it would be a waste if it were to become a mere pretext for the internal clash that is set to take place in Pontida on 20 September. The ideologue behind the Lega’s secessionist phase, Gilberto Oneto, wrote a book in 1997 entitled L’invenzione della Padania (which is now back in bookshops, enriched with new contributions, thanks to the association that preserves its legacy). The term "invention" alluded to its dual meaning: the common one, of creating something that does not exist, and the etymological one, of rediscovering something that does already exist. The Lega has ceased to interpret a real issue politically, but that does not make that issue any less real. It merely makes it harder to see.