Non-negotiable principles for a broad anti-populist coalition

I may be mistaken, but it does not seem to me that, in commemorating Emma Bonino, sufficient emphasis has been placed on the far from marginal role that the Radical leader played in the formation of the Democratic Party. Not only because the Anglo-Saxon two-party system has always been a guiding ideal for the Radicals. But also, more specifically, because Bonino, in 2008, was the head of the Radical delegation standing as candidates on the PD’s lists; she was a member of the PD’s parliamentary group for the entire parliamentary term; and, as a PD representative, she was elected Vice-President of the Senate. The meeting between the Democrats and the Radicals was no easy transition. Veltroni entrusted Goffredo Bettini and me with the negotiations. Marco Pannella would have preferred the option of a Radical list allied with the PD. But the newly formed PD stood firm: ‘We want the Radicals on our lists,’ we said, ‘because we consider their contribution an integral and essential part of that “new way of thinking” – the result of the convergence of various reformist traditions – which we are committed to bringing to full fruition and putting on a firm footing.’ Bonino’s role was decisive in bringing the agreement to a successful conclusion.

It would be beneficial – and perhaps even useful – if the long-awaited (and now, it would seem, finally announced) policy debate within the potential centre-left coalition were to take place, at least in part, under the banner of Emma Bonino. It would also be a way of shaking things up – or perhaps, more simply, of enriching – a debate that risks being reduced to a zero-sum game.

Yet it is precisely the ‘mark’ left by Bonino on Italian political history – as recalled by President Mattarella – that demonstrates how radicalism and realism, utopia and pragmatism are co-essential components of democratic reformism.

It would also be a way of placing the historic ideal of a United States of Europe at the heart and foundation of the progressive coalition’s programme – the tangible utopia behind which the figures of great Italians can be glimpsed: from Alcide De Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli, right through to David Sassoli and Emma Bonino. It is not a goal for tomorrow, we know. But it is both the horizon and the compass that allows us to find our bearings and move, with all the necessary gradualism, in the right direction. Provided, that is, that we know how to draw the necessary, consistent conclusions from it.

The first and most important consequence relates to what appears to be the most intractable of the political and policy issues facing the centre-left: the issue of foreign and defence policy. The concrete historical ideal of a United States of Europe places the issue of peace and war within a very specific framework. We want a United States of Europe first and foremost because, in Kantian terms, peace is possible if, and only if, states are founded on democratic principles (the rule of law and popular sovereignty) and federate with one another—that is, pool increasing amounts of sovereignty. Only in this way can war not only be, but must be, credibly and effectively rejected as an instrument of aggression, and the ‘weapons of law’ can take the place of the ‘law of arms’ in the resolution of international disputes. In all other cases, one can hope for more or less lasting truces, or for a Cold War evolving into peaceful co-existence, but not for true peace. For centuries, Europe has lived through war, with brief truces between one conflict and the next. And in the twentieth century, it was the epicentre of two world wars. The Community of yesterday, the Union of today, and – hopefully – the United States of Europe of tomorrow, have made war between European states unthinkable, if not yet impossible. War is unthinkable between democratic states governed by the rule of law, federated through the growing sharing of sovereignty. Only a reversal of this trend – which, unfortunately, is still not unthinkable today – towards the deterioration of European democracies and the loosening of federal ties could bring war back to the two banks of the Rhine, the two sides of the Alps or Europe’s many other internal borders. This realization constitutes the primary reason to resolutely oppose all forms of sovereignty-based nostalgia—whether extremist or moderate—and instead to advocate for the deepening of federal ties among European states.

But this experience and this vision of Europe cannot fail to become the lens through which to interpret and the compass by which to navigate international politics. This experience and this European federalist vision should inspire a centre-left foreign policy guided by the principle ‘if you want peace, promote and defend democracy’. For when democracy advances, peace is strengthened; when it retreats, war advances. The SIPRI figures on global military spending are striking: a spectacular collapse after 1989, when the advance of democracy seemed unstoppable in Eastern Europe, Latin America and, to some extent, also in Asia and Africa. As the wave of democracy recedes – having been thwarted in Russia and China and following the failure of the Arab-Islamic Springs – military spending is once again rising sharply.

Promoting and defending democracy does not, mind you, mean imposing it from the outside, in line with the aggressive strategy of the American neo-conservatives, which has proved not only to be wrong but even counterproductive. It means fostering the spread of democracy through economic exchanges, diplomatic dialogue and cultural soft power. And defend that spread against anyone who wishes to halt it by force. Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo provides, from this perspective, an illuminating example.

It is for these reasons that the issue of Ukraine has taken on decisive importance, to the extent that the credibility and consistency of the centre-left’s pro-European stance are measured against it: because that conflict is essentially the fierce and brutal violent reaction of an authoritarian regime, such as Putin’s, to the peaceful spread of European democracy. While it is true that Europe (even if it ever had the intention or the capacity to do so) would have no right to impose democracy on anyone, it is equally true that it does, on the contrary, have a clear duty to defend itself, its peaceful and democratic model, and its neighbours – such as the Ukrainians, who freely wish to draw inspiration from and align themselves with that model – against any external aggression, be it conventional or hybrid.

“If you want peace, promote and defend democracy” is a principle that should also guide the political and diplomatic initiatives of Italy and Europe in other geopolitical contexts, starting with the Middle East and, in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The only path to peace remains the two-state solution for the two peoples. However, both states must be democratic in order to trust one another. For this reason, Israeli democracy must be defended against the threat of authoritarian regression posed by the Netanyahu government, and recognition of a Palestinian state should be made conditional upon full respect for democratic principles and the rule of law. Otherwise, there is no alternative to war and its horrors.

For almost eighty years, Europe has entrusted its defence to NATO. It is likely, as well as desirable, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will continue to fulfil this role, beyond the disastrous Trump era. If this is not the case, it will be because the US will have lost its way and the torch of liberty at the entrance to New York Harbour will have ceased to shine. A catastrophic scenario, which Trump has made not unthinkable, but which no democrat can wish for. In any case, it is now clear that NATO will not be able to guarantee Europe’s defence in the asymmetrical ways of the past, through substantial delegation to the US: subordination and dependence must give way to a partnership that is essentially equal and, indeed, predominantly European in the Euro-Mediterranean theatre. Pursuing the historic goal of a United States of Europe therefore means fighting to ensure that competence in matters of foreign policy and defence – currently attributed to the member states – becomes a federal competence, exercised by a governing authority legitimised by the vote of all European citizens and subject to the oversight of the European Parliament. But the transition will not be a short one, and the only way to navigate it effectively – without shirking the pressing responsibilities of the present – is to strengthen national defence structures with a view to progressive integration: on the military, industrial and financial fronts. In a world of carnivores, Europe must remain a herbivore, yet one capable of defending itself against predators. Europe, as the myth depicts it, is a bull, not a rabbit.

The second, fundamental consequence of the regulatory ideal of a United States of Europe is the conviction that economic growth requires open markets and major investment in innovation. As highlighted in the reports by Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta to the European Commission – which the centre-left would do well to adopt as the cornerstones of its programme – Europe’s lag on both these fronts is already being paid for today with a slowdown in growth and the increasingly real threat of decline and marginalisation. Europe’s political weakness is calling into question its very economic strength. It is becoming increasingly clear that one cannot remain an economic giant for long whilst being a political dwarf. With all due respect to all forms of sovereignty, whether explicit or implicit, either we become a giant on the political stage too, or we regress to being a dwarf in economic terms as well.

Europe is fighting tooth and nail to defend the openness of international markets against the Trump administration’s tariff offensive. Making up for a culpable delay of at least a decade – caused by short-sighted corporate resistance and the weakness of politicians who allowed themselves to be blackmailed by such interests – Europe is commendably finalising all the free trade agreements that were initiated but not concluded: from Canada to India, from Mercosur to Australia… After all, embedded in Europe’s very DNA is the principle of open markets and the conviction – itself Kantian in origin – that this is a prerequisite not only for development, but for peace itself. Trade wars are usually the precursor to military conflicts. And the rise of Trumpism is confirming this ironclad historical law.

But Europe is not acting with the necessary consistency on the domestic front. The single market is still, in too many respects, a promise that clashes with the persistent, narrow and stifling reality of twenty-seven national markets, protected by a hidden yet extremely powerful arsenal of internal tariffs, which are not the product of European bureaucracy, but of petty national policies not sufficiently challenged by a transparent and shared agenda for openness. There is no single European market, but twenty-seven small national markets, if even opening a bank account, or buying – or even just hiring – a car in a Member State other than the one in which one resides, are and remain complicated and costly undertakings. Not to mention energy, healthcare, and pensions…

Rallying Italy behind Draghi and Letta in the fight to achieve a genuine single European market, by clearing away the jungle of hidden tariffs, should be one of the cornerstones of the centre-left’s programme. An Italy taking such a stance would also strengthen its authority in proposing a new Keynesian era of major European – and not merely national – investment, financed by Eurobonds, in defence and cutting-edge technologies, major infrastructure and innovation, including artificial intelligence. This is a line that Italy could credibly maintain if it continues to demonstrate its ability to preserve the stability – at least relative stability – of its public finances as a precious common good.

Third consequence: setting the goal of a United States of Europe means reforming the European (and Italian) welfare system to secure its future. The opening up of markets has been the most powerful tool in the fight against global inequalities. As Branko Milanovic, amongst others, has demonstrated, the surge in globalisation at the turn of the 21st century halved, in just a few decades, the income gap between the West and the Rest – between the West and the rest of the world – a gap that had been accumulating, without the trend ever being reversed, over the course of two centuries, from the British Industrial Revolution to the end of the 20th century. But this spectacular reduction in global inequalities has come at the cost of a no less dramatic rise in inequalities (and the perception of them), as well as in the sense of precariousness and insecurity, within the most developed countries. This divide has undermined, and continues to undermine, the very foundations of democracy in the West, as it opens up enormous gaps for populist and sovereigntist political forces – if not explicitly authoritarian and anti-democratic ones. The very issue of immigration – its social and cultural impact, and the difficulties in regulating and managing it – takes on dramatic and explosive dimensions, not least because of this context in which the promise of social progress and security implicit in the democratic contract is losing credibility. In the long run, no democracy can survive the growth of inequality, precariousness and insecurity.

And yet, today’s inequalities cannot be effectively combated with yesterday’s weapons. The strength of capitalism lies in its capacity for constant change. The compromise between democracy and capitalism – which was the liberal-democratic, social-democratic and Christian-democratic masterpiece of the 20th-century Euro-American era – must be able to do the same. It can become the masterpiece of our century, if it translates into a programme not of resistance and conservation, but of reformist innovation. Only by setting our sights this high can we tackle the new challenges posed by demographic change, climate change and technological innovation.