The adventures of extremist tribunalism, from Paris to Rome

Populism – the kind that muddies the waters, tainted by fear and hatred – is in danger of making a major comeback in Europe. And this concerns us; perhaps we are getting ourselves into trouble once again. Reformist liberalism – tenacious and, in its own way, magnificent – with Macron’s impossible yet genuine experiment in France – an anti-liberal, egalitarian, libertarian, barricade-building country tinged with red-brown social attitudes, a country that dreams of Rousseau and has repeatedly betrayed Montesquieu and Constant – has suffered repeated defeats. Yet it has achieved one strategic objective. Marine Le Pen and her heir apparent Bardella have, as the French say, been "de-demonised" and "de-radicalised". Ten years on, they are quite different from where they started, from their original ideology, and from the anti-establishment political choices that once sent a shiver of fear down the spine of the republican Marianne. Many doubts remain regarding European policy, the country’s international stance characterised by Euroscepticism and sovereignty, with a fairly strong suspicion of creeping Putinism, its relationship with the market economy, business and civil society, and on immigration and so-called identitarianism. Yet progress has been made. Bardella, a candidate for Matignon alongside his leader, who is standing for the Élysée, has repeatedly referred to the Meloni experiment in Italy, four years of controversial yet normalised stability for a government led by an outsider force that has taken on an institutional and mainstream profile – conservative rather than ideologically extremist – and this despite the fact that, in the European Parliament, Le Pen’s supporters sit alongside Salvini’s League and other far-right and populist forces, not alongside Meloni’s conservatives.

The problem is that the pursuit of consensus, in polarised situations and in countries where the ideological hegemony of the ruling classes and traditional parties (in France, the Socialists and Gaullists) has waned, and where the ‘clean slate’ mentality prevails as the dominant current of mass opinion, demagoguery and loud rhetoric, and bullying as a method, risk making a comeback and setting in motion a regressive process towards the oversimplification and coarsening of political language. Trump sets the standard; the current winner on the world stage is the one who delegitimises their opponent, shuts down all dialogue, tramples on civil liberties, and even challenges the validity of electoral procedures. For Marine Le Pen, there is the legal complication, and even on that front, ‘Trumpism’ is the inevitable point of reference. To overcome the disadvantage caused by a conviction for the misuse of European funds, the rhetoric of an ideological, anti-establishment crusade may once again resound with fierce intensity. And this applies both to an opponent such as Mélenchon, the tribune of a far-left, red-brown and anti-Semitic movement, and to a moderate with many weaknesses and a somewhat colourless profile such as Edouard Philippe, who is easy to pin down as the de facto heir – despite the differences – to the unpopular Macronian regime. (The social-democratic reformists on the left are likely to be sidelined from the second round, barring any surprises).

Here in Italy, the sensationalist and bullying factor – which could completely distort the fierce yet serious clash between the two female leaders of the centre-right and centre-left – takes the form of the newly arrived outsider, General Vannacci, and the volatile yet surging opinion polls that credit him with a sufficient share of the vote to cause the centre-right to lose if he is outside the alliance, or to heavily influence it if he is included in the coalition. And here too, the marginalisation of the liberal reformists is a predictable fact. As I was saying, perhaps we are getting ourselves into trouble. Reason might once again prove to be in the wrong.