Similarities between FI and IV

Thus, an amendment allows Renzi to be the sole unifying figure for all the centrist factions within the broad coalition

16 JUL 26
Translated by AI
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Rome. Among the混乱 caused yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies by the electoral law, a minor political masterpiece also emerged. It all stems from an amendment tabled by Paolo Emilio Russo, a Forza Italia MP. The provision stipulates that, when calculating the 42 per cent required for a coalition to secure the majority bonus, votes for lists that fell below 3 per cent will not be counted, with one exception: the list which, amongst those excluded, received the most votes – the ‘best loser’. The aim is to prevent the proliferation of splinter groups. Before the amendment, even coalition lists polling between 1 and 3 per cent could contribute to the coalition’s total without winning any seats, whilst the best loser was given a second chance. A coalition therefore had an interest in multiplying the number of subsidiary lists: a ‘Forza Roma’, a ‘Forza Lazio’, a list for every niche, each useful for adding a few decimal points towards the bonus. Under the Russo amendment, after the best loser, the votes for the other minor lists are discarded. Fielding them risks damaging the entire alliance.
On the right, the advantage is clear. The rule bolsters Noi Moderati, the natural frontrunner for the role of "best loser", so much so that in committee it was dubbed the "Save Lupi" clause. It does not guarantee them the seat, as another list could overtake them, but it makes it more costly for competitors with less than 3 per cent of the vote to emerge. The masterstroke begins when the effect shifts to the other side and puts Matteo Renzi back at the centre of the broad political spectrum. Until now, the project built around Alessandro Onorato had been clear. Onorato, Rome’s Councillor for Tourism, Sport and Major Events, founded Progetto Civico Italia: a network of local councillors, inspired by Goffredo Bettini and viewed favourably by Giuseppe Conte, created to offer the centre-left a civic alternative to Renzi. Under the previous rule, Onorato and Italia Viva could have stood separately. The candidate with the most votes below 3 per cent would have been the ‘best loser’; the votes for the other candidate, provided they exceeded 1 per cent, would still have helped bring the broad coalition closer to the bonus.
The plan was clear: to make Onorato the first of the losers and Renzi the second, thereby securing Renzi’s votes without granting Italia Viva any parliamentary representation. The Russo amendment throws a spanner in the works. If Onorato and Renzi stand as separate candidates and both remain below 3 per cent, only the votes for the frontrunner will count towards the coalition’s result; those for the runner-up will be disregarded.
Then there is the detail that makes the situation even more favourable for Renzi. Within the centrist wing of the broad coalition, Italia Viva is the only party exempt from collecting signatures, thanks to the rule that exempts parties formed as a parliamentary group in at least one Chamber by 31 December 2025. Progetto Civico Italia and Più Europa can collect signatures and stand on their own, but they would risk losing votes and failing to qualify for the bonus. There are two possible solutions. The first is to unite Onorato, Magi and the other centrists with Italia Viva, using Renzi’s political vehicle and negotiating the party symbol, candidacies and lead candidates. The second is to ask the PD to accommodate the civic candidates, whilst relinquishing the project’s autonomy. Thus, a rule designed to protect Noi Moderati and crush ‘decoy’ lists has transformed Renzi – whom Bettini and Conte wanted to render superfluous – into the almost inevitable stepping stone to saving their centre. Italia Viva, not coincidentally, was in favour. The best loser, for now, is the winner.