Not just Vannacci. Generali d’Italia. Great stories, achievements, heroes and aspirations

There’s always a first time, and Roberto Vannacci’s is truly a first. It is he himself who has turned the tables, not the world that so vehemently sought to crucify him. Never before in a united Italy had a senior officer on active duty stood as a candidate to lead a new movement poised to become a political party. The book launched on Amazon is not the grand outburst of a frustrated general, but a genuine manifesto for entering the political arena (political, not military). Looking back at history from 1860 onwards, the boundary between the armed forces’ top brass and the state government has proved porous – and there are striking examples. However, the move into politics used to take place once the uniform had been laid aside or through an appointment by democratic institutions; in more recent times, as independent figures – much like managers or economists – the ‘professors’ so hated by populists, yet so useful and often effective. Silvio Berlusconi, in one of his spur-of-the-moment ideas, had in 2017 named Carabinieri General Leonardo Gallitelli as the head of a future government; Gallitelli, however, had already stepped down from command of the Carabinieri to take on a role in anti-doping. General Domenico Corcione and Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola served as defence ministers in technocratic governments, the former under Lamberto Dini, the latter under Prime Minister Mario Monti. Not this time, however; this time it is constitutional tradition itself that is being turned on its head. Vannacci is not concerned with the art of war, but with the art of propaganda; he has become the star of a spectacle that could turn into a political earthquake. With him, generals might leave the ranks to form their own forces. Fortunately, this is still merely an exception, even if it sounds like a wake-up call. So, let’s take a look at who is watching over our external and internal security.

Sun Tzu or Clausewitz? Rommel or Georgy Zhukov, Colin Powell or Mykhailo Fedorov? Strategy and tactics, men and resources, doctrine and practice – everything is constantly changing; our security is never entirely guaranteed. There is endless debate on defence, on Italy’s rearmament or, rather, on its adaptation to the new international and European landscape, but the dilemma is always the same: butter or guns. Let us set aside this economic-based approach (important though it is) and ask ourselves whether the armed forces are ready. Doing so immediately opens two doors: the first leads us to the question of what needs to be done, the second to who does it and how.

We could divide the post-war period into four phases – plus a fifth, which is, however, only just taking shape. The first, that of reconstruction, is still a legacy of the bloody past, caught between defeat at the hands of the Anglo-American Allies and the internal Resistance. It was from this period that the senior officers emerged who would play a leading role right up until the 1960s. The second phase is marked by the ‘dark knights’, those who controlled foreign and domestic intelligence services that grew ever more powerful as the Cold War intensified: General De Lorenzo, to name but one. The third phase is dominated by internal security, the fight against terrorism and the Mafia, and here the hero is undoubtedly Dalla Chiesa. The fourth phase began in the 1980s, under President Pertini, with the Italian armed forces’ first major overseas mission, in Lebanon. Since then, the entire military leadership has become increasingly internationalised, gradually integrating with NATO, both in doctrine and in practice. Commanders develop strategy, tactics and organisation alongside their colleagues in the Atlantic Alliance, under a dominant American influence. The armed forces have become professionalised, and compulsory military service has also come to an end. Now is the time for a twofold leap forward: technological and strategic.

Deployment to hotspots – indeed, scorching hotspots – is expanding, from Bosnia to Afghanistan, from Central Africa to the Indian Ocean, across north-eastern Europe, and even in Saudi Arabia with 400 troops; as a result, international missions and operations have risen to 40 and have so far cost one and a half billion euros a year. Generals no longer study the art of war solely from books; they are becoming its protagonists, whether in the form of peacekeeping or even the ‘imposition’ of peace. The fifth phase is that of a new global imbalance accompanying the digital revolution, a phase being forged with the blood of Ukraine and the massacres in the Middle East. The Italian armed forces are not yet ready; they need to adapt fundamentally to the new scenario, and following the American model does not help – quite the contrary.

The United States’ approach to warfare remains the same as it has always been: to deploy the maximum available force to attack the centre of gravity of the enemy’s forces and destroy it. General Colin Powell applied this strategy in the first Gulf War, with the liberation of Kuwait following its invasion by Saddam Hussein. Its application proved far more complicated during the invasion of Iraq, particularly once urban guerrilla warfare broke out. Against Iran, the Pentagon followed the same doctrine once more, and it did not go well. Why? Paul Scharre, deputy executive director at the Centre for New American Security, explains this in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs: “The United States still has the most powerful military in the world, but it is not prepared for the new era of warfare – an era of drones that have transformed both the dynamics of combat and the economic landscape,” writes Scharre. ‘It is already clear that the US military must produce its own low-cost drones and interceptors, adapting them to the imperatives of artificial intelligence.’ The American military-industrial complex has been caught off guard and is struggling to adapt; this is even more true of its European and Italian counterparts, which were largely formed under American auspices and adopted its doctrine. But before we delve into the equipment, let’s take a look at who is piloting them.

The post of Chief of the General Staff was introduced in 1985 by Giovanni Spadolini, then Minister of Defence, to streamline the high command, mediate, bring together different perspectives and, as far as possible, avoid traditional rivalries between the different branches of the armed forces. It is standard practice for there to be a rotation at the top. From 2024, the role will fall to General Luciano Antonio Portolano. A 66-year-old Sicilian from Agrigento and a Bersagliere, he has held various roles ranging from operational command to military attaché at the Italian Embassy in London. Commander of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon from 2014 to 2016, in August 2021 he led Operation Aquila Omnia, which enabled the transfer of over five thousand people, mainly Afghans, to Italy. The Army is led by Lieutenant General Carmine Masiello, born in 1963 in the province of Caserta; an artillery officer, he attended secondary school in Belgium (his father was posted to NATO headquarters) and holds three degrees (from Bologna, Turin and Trieste) as well as having graduated from the Modena Military Academy. A paratrooper with the Folgore Brigade, he saw his first action in Bosnia, followed by Lebanon, Somalia and Afghanistan – where he criticised the work of the AISE (foreign intelligence service), addressing the then Chief of the Defence Staff, Biagio Abrate. In short, Masiello is a tough character. To Gianni Alemanno, who described the Folgore as “the quintessence of the Italian right”, he replied: “We are the quintessence of the homeland”. The Navy is commanded by Admiral Giuseppe Berutti Bergotto, a graduate of the Naval Academy in Livorno, who has undertaken a wide variety of deployments and missions; he has also taught at Annapolis, the US Naval Academy. At the helm of the Air Force for the past year has been Antonio Conserva, an Air Force General from Taranto, aged 63, who cut his teeth flying the F-104 Starfighter; he spent three years in the United States before returning to Italy, first to the 61st and then to the 36th Wing. He then moved on to ‘bureaucratic’ and organisational roles, eventually rising to the General Staff. Since 2021, he has served as chief of staff, first to Minister Lorenzo Guerini and then to Guido Crosetto. The fourth branch of the armed forces, the Carabinieri, welcomed Salvatore Luongo, a native of Naples and one of the ‘Nunziatella boys’, in 2024. He commanded the most important regional commands, such as those in Rome and Milan; from 2006 to 2011 he served at the Quirinale alongside Giorgio Napolitano; and he also has extensive experience as Chief of Legislative Affairs at the Ministry of Defence.

How different are today’s top generals from those of the past? In the immediate post-war period, there were only two sources from which to draw military personnel: the royal armed forces and the anti-fascist Resistance fighting against the German occupation. These were often opposing forces, but during the harshest years of the Cold War they demonstrated a remarkable convergence. Following General Raffaele Cadorna’s brief tenure, Efisio Marras was appointed to lead the army in 1947. He had been imprisoned by the Germans and handed over in 1944 to the Salò regime, which detained him in prisons in Verona and Gazi Ligure, from where he managed to escape to Switzerland. Alberto Briganti, a pioneer of aviation who was entrusted with rebuilding the Air Force, was also imprisoned by the Nazis. Since 1947, the Navy has been under the command of Francesco Maugeri, who organised clandestine activities from Rome after 8 September.

A singular figure from that tragic era remains the moustachioed Admiral Gino Birindelli, a war hero (for having managed to penetrate Gibraltar), a prisoner of the British who was released in 1943, loyal to the King; with the establishment of the Republic, he became a rear admiral and held important posts, including at NATO. In 1972, having completed his service, he became president of the Social Movement and a member of parliament. A staunch monarchist, his ‘fiery temperament’ meant he failed to fit in here either; he came into open conflict with Giorgio Almirante and even ended up on the P2 lists. Giovanni De Lorenzo served in the Russian campaign as an artilleryman; after 8 September 1943, he became a partisan, first in the Alps and then in Rome. He forged links with the National Liberation Committee, was also held in high regard by the left, received decorations and was promoted; in 1952, he was put in charge of SIFAR, the intelligence service, where he became extremely powerful. Backed by the President of the Republic, Giovanni Gronchi, and his protégé Enrico Mattei, the head of ENI, he began a systematic programme of profiling in the very style of Edgar J. Hoover’s FBI. Around two thousand files were ordered to be destroyed by Giulio Andreotti in 1974. De Lorenzo also pulled the strings in the fierce battles for the Quirinale between the Christian Democrat heavyweights. He organised the ‘Solo’ plan, but in 1962 he became commander of the Carabinieri thanks to the decisive vote of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Four years later, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Army, with the support of the left, starting with Nenni and Saragat. In 1967, he was dismissed for ‘deviations’ during his time at SIFAR when – as later revealed in L’Espresso, edited by Eugenio Scalfari – he had plotted a military-political coup. All the contradictions of Italy – both the monarchy and the republic – seem to be concentrated in the figures of the ‘dark knights’ or the generals who wore ‘fake beards’, as Francesco Cossiga put it, a man who knew a thing or two about spies. Among them, Vito Miceli stands out; he too became an MSI MP once he had hung up his camouflage uniform.

Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa has attained legendary status. A leading figure in the fight against terrorism and the Mafia, he was murdered in Palermo in 1982, along with his young wife Emanuela Setti Carraro and his bodyguard Domenico Russo. A carabiniere and the son of a carabiniere, he too took part in the Resistance and, from 1947, devoted himself to combating banditry and organised crime, first in Campania and then in Sicily, until 1973 when he was transferred to Turin, promoted to brigadier-general and tasked with defeating the Red Brigades. He set up an anti-terrorism unit and, in 1978, was granted special powers – though not without facing both external and internal opposition. In 1982, he was appointed Prefect of Palermo; he took office on 30 April, and on that very same day, Pio La Torre – secretary of the Sicilian branch of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the MP who had tabled the bill criminalising mafia association – was murdered. A decisive and imperious figure, Dalla Chiesa secured a scope for action that had previously been impossible, experiencing both successes and defeats, such as in the Moro case. His assassination at the hands of Totò Riina and Beppe Provenzano paved the way for the rise of Cosa Nostra.

It was NATO that established the rules for external security, but ever since the number one enemy – the Soviet Union – collapsed, the number of enemies has begun to multiply. Traditional wars in the forests of Bosnia and, today, on the plains of Ukraine, but also asymmetric conflicts and widespread terrorism. Defence doctrine and practice had to change. And so emerged the intellectual generals who introduced new or revitalised visions. A prime example is Carlo Jean, a general and former adviser to Cossiga, who revived geopolitics in Italy – a Nordic doctrine (originating in Sweden, practised in Germany as ‘Lebensraum’, or living space) that had been eclipsed by the political and ideological clash between the American and Soviet empires. Generals have played important roles as advisers to the President of the Republic, who chairs the Supreme Defence Council and holds command of the Armed Forces.

There are now many officers who have been thoroughly integrated into and trained by NATO, with experience gained in the United States and on dangerous missions across various theatres of operation. We should remember Franco Angioni, who died a year ago. He was a colonel in 1982 when, immediately after the massacre of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila at the hands of the Lebanese Phalange, under the indifferent gaze of the Israeli army, he was entrusted with leading the Multinational Force in Lebanon. It was a true baptism of fire, even though their task was one of ‘interposition’, acting as a buffer between the combatants. Appointed in 1989 as an adviser to Ciriaco De Mita, then Prime Minister, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 2001 as a member of the Democrats of the Left following his retirement from the military. The Birindelli era was over.

The cursus honorum begins as soon as pupils leave compulsory education. Between the ages of 15 and 17, after completing two years at a civilian school, it is possible to sit a public entrance examination to join a military institution such as the Nunziatella in Naples or the Francesco Morosini Naval Academy in Venice. Upon completion, those who choose to continue must pass another entrance examination to gain admission to the academy. There are three such academies, but only the one in Modena prepares students for a career that could lead to the rank of four-star general. Students study various subjects as part of a standard university programme, alongside military training. After two years, cadets are promoted to second lieutenant and alternate between theoretical study and periods of practical training within operational units. Promotion to the rank of lieutenant is possible upon obtaining a degree, whilst appointment as a captain takes place only seven to nine years after graduation; this is followed by five years in that role for those wishing to apply to become a major and, subsequently, a lieutenant-colonel. Most generals have decades of military experience.

Knowledge of several languages is essential, starting with English at the very least. A handbook for those wishing to embark on this long and difficult journey sets out the fundamental qualities one must possess or acquire: study, dedication, courage, experience, strong communication skills, active listening, commitment, cultural awareness, insight, the ability to solve complex problems, a strong sense of organisation and discipline, but also adaptability. With all this, one can achieve a good level of leadership, but to become truly outstanding, one needs that certain something that not everyone possesses. A young person, reading all these guidelines, is bound to feel daunted, but the secret, ultimately, lies in the ability to take it one step at a time.

Vannacci, too, rose through the ranks from Modena onwards, eventually reaching the intermediate rank of Major General (two stars – higher than Brigadier General and lower than Lieutenant General) and only in 2023 upon his return from Moscow. He undertook field missions – in Afghanistan, for example – and worked in embassies; he commanded the paratroopers of the Col Moschin and Folgore regiments, and headed the international relations office at the Defence Staff. It was precisely this exposure that earned him a network of contacts which he now intends to put to good use for the New Right International.

This brief overview makes it clear that the military leadership, particularly that which has emerged since the 1990s, possesses a broader range of expertise than the average member of a fundamentally domestic political class. There is a gap in competence, experience and vision compared with the vast majority of MPs and ministers; a difference that must be utilised with loyalty and respect for the Constitution and the institutions.

This is not stated out of caution or modesty, but Italy is one of the world’s strongest military powers, ranking tenth in the Global Firepower Index and second within the European Union (just behind France). There are 165,000 soldiers on active service at all levels, out of a total strength of 288,800 personnel, including reservists and security forces. The defence budget stands at approximately 37.3 billion dollars. The Air Force has nearly 1,000 aircraft, including advanced fifth-generation fighter-bombers (such as the F-35). The Navy has a modern fleet comprising aircraft carriers (the Cavour and the Trieste) and advanced submarines. The Army is equipped with armoured vehicles, artillery and highly specialised infantry for international missions. Following the end of the Cold War, whilst serving as Minister of Defence, General Domenico Corcione initiated a transformation, though without changing the model of the armed forces. After the 2003 attack in Nasiriyah, under the auspices of the ‘Antica Babilonia’ mission, various investigations highlighted the limitations of the recruitment system based on compulsory military service. The armed forces were caught off guard by the emergence of other small-scale conflicts, such as those in Iraq and Bosnia. In 2005, under Minister Antonio Martino, compulsory military service was suspended (it can be reinstated if necessary; a decree is all that is required). A professional army was thus adopted, with training tailored to NATO and UN standards (peacekeeping and peace enforcement).

These are the strengths; the weaknesses stem from insufficient financial resources to adapt the Italian defence system to new threats and to the geopolitical landscape in Europe – particularly following the invasion of Ukraine – and to the new ‘perfect storms’ sweeping across the Middle East, from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Since the Lebanon mission, the Italian Army has demonstrated its ability to manage peacekeeping missions, but it has not been deployed in open combat operations. The Navy is effective at patrolling the seas and combating piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Air Force had its baptism of fire in the first Gulf War in 1991 and then in the Kosovo campaign eight years later. In any case, however, a dilemma has arisen that needs resolving. Deployment on international missions absorbs the bulk of resources and leaves the rear exposed, so to speak. And this calls into question the role of the Army in particular.

The Navy is amongst the best, and the Air Force holds its own, although there is a need to make the leap to Superjets to replace the 115 American F-35s. Submarine warfare is a key focus. We have submarines, but a weakness in our submarine fleet has been addressed by the agreement with Germany for the U-212s, which are not nuclear-powered but can remain submerged for 15 to 20 days without needing to surface to take on air. Control of the underwater world is truly vital; a network of cables, pipes and oil pipelines, through which both energy resources and data flow, is fundamental.

New technologies do not replace those of the past; rather, they complement and transform them. It is in the field of mechanised equipment that Italy finds itself at a disadvantage compared with other powers, with just 200 Italian-built main battle tanks, the Ariete C1s, designed in 1984 and entering active service in 1995. The Defence Minister has launched a plan to procure German Panther tanks, manufactured in Italy by a joint venture between Leonardo and the Franco-German firm KNDs. The agreement with the German group Rheinmetall will supply the Lynx infantry fighting vehicles. By 2040, there should be 271 Panthers and over a thousand Lynxes. If we are talking about people rather than machines, it is not just a matter of making the technological leap based on what we have learnt from Ukraine; we also need to strengthen those carrying out the manoeuvres – that middle echelon which does not, in itself, possess a combat mindset. General Masiello is aware of this and is working on it, experts say, but time and resources are needed for training.

Recruitment has become more difficult for demographic and cultural reasons. In the navy, it is hard to say ‘I’m signing on’ and be away for months whilst one’s wife lights the lamp by the door. The legend of a girlfriend in every port is more befitting a merchant seaman than a combatant. Rebuilding and maintaining an adequate reserve of personnel is one of the main challenges, and this too requires years and resources – a point that Minister Guido Crosetto never tires of emphasising. Two draft bills provide for an increase of 40,000 personnel by 2033 and the establishment of a reserve divided into an ‘operational mobilisation’ reserve, comprising personnel who can be recalled to service for up to five years after discharge, and a specialist voluntary reserve.

Let’s return to Vannacci. There’s always a first time; who knows if this will be the last. He has written and spoken about everything, but amidst all this display of words and images, amidst dressing gowns and Roman tunics, we do not know which ‘doctrine’ he follows or what the Generalissimo would do to defend his country from external enemies. Here we immediately encounter his greatest weakness. In Moscow, during his three years as a military attaché at the Italian embassy, he encountered Mother Russia and Father Vlad. His infatuation was so blatant as to arouse suspicions that, for a member of the Italian Armed Forces, go very, very far indeed. When Vannacci published his book in August 2023, Crosetto spoke of “personal ramblings” and the entire army general staff were taken completely by surprise. In February 2024, the general was suspended for 11 months; Matteo Salvini then had him elected as a Member of the European Parliament, before realising he’d let a poisonous worm into his own house. Now Futuro Nazionale’s ‘dirty dozen’ is gnawing away at the League, nibbling at Fratelli d’Italia and pecking here and there at the scattered grains of Italian politics.

According to one school of thought, even he isn’t quite sure where to go; the opposing school wonders whether this is truly a flash in the pan or the harbinger of a far greater storm; a third school suspects an internal conspiracy – and, far more likely, an international one – with its sights set on Moscow. It is striking that, amongst all the comments made on television and online, there is nothing about what a general ought to know and what he ought to be dealing with. The new threats coming from the East, from the Far East and from those closer to home? We must place our trust in Tsar Vlad and send neither money nor weapons to Zelensky. A just peace? No, the only peace is that of the victors – the most common of clichés. What does the general think of the ‘organisation’ that gave him a career and a not-bad salary (as a major-general, the highest rank he attained, he earned around 5,000 euros net per month)? For the time being, he’s floundering somewhere between Junio Valerio Borghese and Beppe Grillo, perhaps dreaming of Charles de Gaulle, or maybe Augusto Pinochet. All his own ideas? Ah, if only we knew, if only we knew…