The law does not wear white gloves

The reversal of blame and the attribution of the crime to those who fought it. De Gennaro and Mori. Those who captured Buscetta or arrested Riina end up in the dock. The story of a downward spiral born of the follies of judicial moralism
18 NOV 26
Translated by AI
Image of The law does not wear white gloves

Mario Mori (Photo: Ansa) and Gianni De Gennaro (Photo: Ansa)

A sense of bewildered curiosity appears to have taken hold in public opinion regarding a phenomenon that seems typically Italian: the blatant reversal of blame and the attribution of the crime to those who fought against it. Let us consider the case of General Mario Mori. He arrested Riina, the Corleonesi’s top man: he ended up on trial for having negotiated with the Mafia on behalf of the state and had to wait years for his acquittal. Or let us look at Gianni De Gennaro, a senior figure in the police and intelligence services, who had a distinguished career managing turncoats in the decisive Buscetta case, alongside Giovanni Falcone and the FBI, and who helped build the case for the ‘Cupola’ trial: He has just been put on trial for aiding the Mafia and obstructing the investigation into the 1992 Via D’Amelio massacre, and it remains to be seen what lies ahead for him. Falcone himself, an undisputed hero and martyr, before his death whilst serving as Director of Criminal Affairs in the Andreotti government, was subjected to a media trial – a purely media trial – and to professional isolation, through insinuating and allusive methods and arguments concerning his connections and his alleged reluctance to delve into the inner workings of organised crime; this is how his anti-Mafia detractors described him. These are old, worn-out stories, upon which time has laid a layer of dust and mist.
In 1989, a famous turncoat, Salvatore Contorno – who played a decisive role in dismantling the clans – was arrested, but suspicions arose that this police operation, carried out in the sensitive area of criminal collaboration with the state and overseen by De Gennaro and Police Commissioner Arnaldo La Barbera, had been a source of illegality and mystery. Contorno, known as ‘Totuccio’, appeared to have waged his own personal war against the clans and his former ‘coscaroli’ colleagues, armed and deployed by state forces, who reaped the benefits of his informant role and other advantages typical of the techniques of the ‘pentito’ system. This ‘story of stories’ was then linked to the Addaura assassination attempt on Falcone – which remains a perplexing mystery – and, shortly afterwards, the massive cover-up operation surrounding the murder of Paolo Borsellino and his escort, which implicated half a dozen picciotti, the active mobilisation of investigators and police officers, and the delusional and sinister affair of ‘Il Corvo’, the anonymous informant within the Palermo judiciary, as well as the arrest, prolonged detention, trial and systematic destruction of police officer Bruno Contrada, who used informants and worked with them in the old-school police manner. Unsurprisingly, and indeed present in the now-revived story surrounding De Gennaro, is the accusation that he facilitated the natural and ever-alleged mafia-like nature of Silvio Berlusconi’s circle.
Mario Mori and Gianni De Gennaro are no mere footnotes in the history of the state and its law enforcement agencies. They are towering and highly controversial figures, as is only natural for those who harbour secrets, for those who have, out of necessity, had to deal with powerful and devious criminals whilst fighting them or attempting to neutralise them, for those whose very history has destined them to protect all that remains unsaid regarding police operations and borderline investigations, to cover their tracks, within a web of relationships that resembles a spider’s web rather than a cultural dialogue. The carabiniere and the police officer played their part in the heat of mafia-related events and later headed the secret services; having navigated careers of immense responsibility; both ultimately became the subject of investigations, wiretaps and judicial plots that effectively reversed the blame, hypothetically placing them in the shoes of the Mafia bosses in that role of aiding and abetting the organisation, and of undermining and debasing the civil and moral identity of the state. Since we often adopt the role of armchair moralists, pretending that evil cannot be fought with generous doses of evil and insisting that the rule of law must be defended with legal treatises and codicils, we ultimately end up with a reversal of guilt: those who caught Buscetta or arrested Riina end up in the dock in their place because they did not wear the white gloves of the law. Strange.