Demanding justice for Garlasco is right; doing so by engaging in a witch-hunt without evidence is not

As is evident to readers, the Garlasco trial has, in recent times, been turned by many observers into an unwitting showcase for due process. In the Poggi case, this emphasis on due process stems from a genuine sentiment – namely, the idea that a person convicted by the Court of Cassation, who ended up in prison after being acquitted twice, cannot be considered guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and we are, of course, talking about Alberto Stasi. Over time, however, a sizeable ‘Stasi fanbase’ has coalesced around this genuine sentiment which, as often happens with any fanbase, has begun to apply the same questionable methods used against Stasi to the new figure who has ended up at the centre of the Garlasco storm: Andrea Sempio. The result is well known: the supporters defending Stasi have chosen to set aside the principle of upholding legal safeguards in order to prove that it was Sempio – and not Stasi – who killed Chiara Poggi.

The latest case to galvanise the Stasi faction concerned the famous statement issued two days ago by the Pavia Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Pavia Public Prosecutor’s Office has closed new investigations into Sempio. In filing the new documents, it reported on a number of findings. Among these, it highlighted that the raw data from the RIS Carabinieri unit contains a detail that has been overlooked in recent years, relating to the existence of two analyses which indicate that no DNA attributable to Chiara Poggi was found on the material taken from the pedals of Stasi’s bicycle. This is, in fact, one of the most important pieces of evidence pointing to Stasi’s guilt. The statement from the Pavia Public Prosecutor’s Office alludes to some sort of underhand cover-up. And the prosecutor’s suspicion was promptly transformed yesterday into an established fact: according to the interpretation given by many newspapers, the Carabinieri criminally concealed those findings solely to frame Stasi, and with that evidence it would have been possible to exonerate Chiara Poggi’s former boyfriend as long as nineteen years ago.

The distortion is clear: an argument put forward by Stasi’s defence team, taken up and emphasised by the prosecutors investigating Sempio, finds its way into a press release from the Pavia Public Prosecutor’s Office and, by virtue of the authority of the source from which it originates, that partial truth becomes a certified truth. The truth is partial not only because it is a biased truth but because, on careful reading of the documents, one can easily discover (a) that the analyses in question were not hidden away in a drawer, as claimed by those who challenge the prosecutor’s office’s version, but were available to the parties; and that (b) whilst there were negative results regarding the presence of Chiara Poggi’s DNA on the famous pedals, there are three positive results (one partial with six markers and two complete with all markers) which demonstrate the presence of Chiara Poggi’s DNA on the pedals of Stasi’s bicycle. Some findings were given weight, whilst others were not. This analysis is not intended to enter into a reckless debate about who is innocent, who is guilty, who the real instigator is, or who is truly responsible for the murder.

We are writing all this to try to shed light on a small truth that deserves not to be lost in the debate amongst the fan bases: if one wishes to regard Stasi as a victim of a trial characterised by gaps, mysteries and uncertainties, one cannot apply the same methods of public shaming, lynching and condemnation to other individuals, such as Sempio, or to the RIS officers themselves, methods which we rightly ask not to be applied against Stasi. The Garlasco case has been there for nineteen years, showing us the worst of our judicial system. To avoid repeating the mistakes made over these nineteen years, it would suffice to go back to basics and perhaps remember that, in a state governed by the rule of law, evidence counts for more than insinuations; that the trial held in a courtroom counts for more than the one played out on the front pages of newspapers; and that a prosecution’s case does not become the truth simply because of a good newspaper headline.