There is a very Italian way of talking about home

There is a very Italian way of discussing housing: starting with the final price and pretending that everything that comes before it does not exist. If rents rise, people look for someone to blame: the landlord, the property fund, the platform, the tourist, the developer. Then comes the solution: freeze, ban, tax. But a city where the number of people wanting to live, study and work is growing, whilst the housing supply is barely increasing, does not become more affordable by decree. It becomes more selective.

In 2016, Auckland, New Zealand, allowed for higher density across around three-quarters of its residential area. Subsequent assessments estimate over twenty thousand additional homes and rents for family homes between 22 and 35 per cent lower than in a scenario without reform. The moral of the story: increasing building rights means increasing the number of people who can compete to provide homes.

Japan offers a second lesson. Its urban planning system uses relatively permissive, standardised zoning categories and primarily sets out permitted development densities and impacts. In 2026, Tokyo established funds for affordable housing: the city is pooling capital with banks, property companies and investors to provide homes at rents of around 75–80 per cent of market rates, including by repurposing vacant properties.

Vienna is often cited as proof that it is enough simply to build social housing. The model is more sophisticated. Part of the housing supply is provided by limited-profit housing associations: private entities, co-operatives or companies that may generate profits, but must reinvest a large proportion of these in new housing and refurbishments. Rents are linked to costs, and funding combines public loans, bank credit and operators’ capital. According to the OECD, these account for over two-thirds of Austria’s social and affordable housing stock and also include private rents. The issue is not public versus private: it is about making them work together.

France has devised a valuable scheme: the ‘logement locatif intermédiaire’, or intermediate rental housing. It is neither social housing nor the purely private market, but a solution for those who earn too much to qualify for social housing and too little to afford rents in the most expensive areas. The state offers tax incentives, investors provide the capital, and rents remain below market rates. In 2024, the government signed an agreement to fund 75,000 intermediate housing units over three years; fourteen insurance companies had committed to investing over 400 million euros. The planned projects include the conversion of offices, commercial premises and industrial sites.

Australia has opted for an even more explicit version of its pact with capital: making ‘build-to-rent’ more cost-effective, provided it delivers affordability. For new projects, the government has halved the withholding tax applied to certain fund investments from 30 per cent to 15 per cent and accelerated the deductibility of construction costs. In return, projects benefiting from these incentives must comprise at least fifty dwellings, remain under a single ownership for at least fifteen years and allocate at least 10 per cent of the dwellings to affordable rents, with rents not exceeding 74.9 per cent of the market rate. If you want patient capital, you must establish rules suited to patient capital.

These are different models; none is a magic wand. Auckland shows that the primary social policy is to increase supply. Vienna demonstrates that profit can be capped and reinvested without excluding the private sector. France is building a bridge for the middle class. Australia uses the tax system to transform funds and insurance companies into providers of rental housing. Tokyo combines public and private funding, rather than replacing the latter with the former. To bring down the cost of housing, we need to increase the quantity, quality and variety of housing.

The comparison is an uncomfortable one for Italy. In 2025, around 59 billion euros were invested in ‘living’ across Europe. In Italy, build-to-rent remains a marginal sector: the bulk of capital is concentrated on student accommodation and developments intended for sale. It is often easier to sell a flat than to build and manage a rental property for decades.

Housing policy should turn the question on its head: not ‘how do we keep prices down?’, but ‘how do we build many more homes where they are needed?’. We need reasonable levels of density near the metro, stations and universities; planning permissions with fixed timelines; easier changes of use for obsolete offices and commercial properties; public land allocated to those offering the most affordable housing; stable incentives for build-to-rent schemes; public-private partnerships; rent-control quotas compatible with the sustainability of projects; and long-term, predictable contracts.

Housing is too important a right to be reduced to slogans: it cannot be defended by treating capital as an intruder. The public must prioritise the common good, help those who are struggling and demand a level of affordability. But if it truly wants to bring rents down, it must do something that seems suspect in Italy: make it profitable to build homes. Demagoguery promises low rents without investors. Innovation tries to achieve them by encouraging greater investment.

Not a culprit to be punished, but homes to be built. Higher density, simpler planning permission, institutional capital, and affordable rents in exchange for incentives. The lesson for Italy: the market must be corrected where it fails, but first it must be put in a position to function