Fauda, Naza and the lesson the Arab world teaches us about 7 October

There are two seemingly unrelated news stories which, when placed side by side, reveal something about our times. The first: in Italy, the documentary "Naza", which focuses on Israeli military operations in Gaza, is top of the box office with takings of over three million euros. The second: on Netflix, Fauda, the Israeli series whose fifth season tackles the trauma of 7 October, was the most-watched programme in Lebanon during the week of 7–13 September, fourth in Jordan and Qatar, and fifth in the UAE. A ranking is not a political poll. But a question springs to mind: what if 7 October – understood as a manifestation of jihadist extremism – had been better understood, in certain respects, by some Arab societies than by parts of the West?

The first point is the distinction – one that is tending to disappear in the West – between the Palestinian cause and Hamas. The Franco-Algerian writer Kamel Daoud pointed out that those who have experienced Islamism in Algeria recognise its methods. One does not need to be pro-Israeli to denounce fanaticism: one need only recall what it has wrought in one’s own country. The second point comes from Gaza. In March 2025, in Beit Lahia and elsewhere, hundreds of Palestinians took to the streets to demand an end to the war and to protest against Hamas as well. Amnesty International has documented threats, interrogations and beatings directed against them. They had not become supporters of Netanyahu: they were asserting their right to be Palestinians without being represented by Hamas. Then there are the figures. According to a survey by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in August 2026, 65 per cent of Gaza’s inhabitants consider the armed resistance to have failed. In the territories, support for Hamas has fallen from 35 to 24 per cent in ten months, and the proportion of those who consider armed struggle to be the most effective strategy has dropped from 41 to 27 per cent.

In July 2025, the New York Declaration, backed by major Arab countries, condemned the attacks of 7 October, called for the release of the hostages and stipulated that Hamas should leave the Gaza government and hand over its weapons. In Lebanon, in March 2026, the government declared Hezbollah’s military activities illegal. These are signs of a growing realisation: armed resistance can also threaten the very societies it claims to defend. The paradox is that part of the West seems to struggle more to make the same distinction. We have seen European demonstrations in which 7 October was celebrated as a revolution. This is not everyone’s view, and it would be absurd to overlook Israel’s responsibilities in Gaza. But why should it be difficult to condemn both the suffering of the Palestinians and the fanaticism of Hamas?

Perhaps the real difference is not geographical: it lies between those who judge a cause by its slogans and those who judge it by its results, between those who can romanticise a war and those who must live with its consequences. The Arab success of "Fauda" is significant not because it demonstrates love for Israel, but because it illustrates a willingness to engage with the other’s narrative without feeling like traitors. Can there be a liberation that begins with the deliberate massacre of civilians? Perhaps we should listen less to those who turn resistance into a myth and a little more to those who know the price it exacts.

Text translated using AI