Europe is buying time. An analysis of the EU’s anti-panic energy measures

As of yesterday, Eni has set the maximum price of petrol at €1.99 and diesel at €2.19 across the Enilive network – approximately 17 cents below the company’s stated average – for a period of thirty days, extendable until the end of the year. IP, a subsidiary of Azerbaijan’s Socar, has announced a similar cap. This comes on top of the government’s decision to temporarily cut excise duties on diesel. The impact is well known. The war in the Middle East has made the global supply of fuels more uncertain, whilst Europe remains vulnerable when it comes to refined products. Eni points out that almost thirty refineries have been closed on the continent over the past fifteen years. The Commission rules out an immediate supply problem for the winter of 2026–27, but acknowledges the impact of rising prices on households and businesses.

The precedent from 2022 is useful here. During the Russian gas crisis, the European Union organised joint purchases, stockpiling, demand reduction and temporary aid. The price cap on the TTF never came into effect: it was designed as an emergency brake, not as a new standard pricing system. When the market stabilised, many of the exceptional measures came to an end.

The 2026 crisis has brought the same toolkit back into use. Brussels has introduced temporary aid for vulnerable sectors and targeted tax cuts, whilst coordinating the stockpiling and release of reserves. The IEA has coordinated a major release of emergency oil reserves. The common feature is their temporary nature, as these measures have side effects. A blanket cut in excise duties weighs on the budget and, if it lasts too long, can prop up demand whilst supply is scarce. An indiscriminate subsidy also helps those who do not need it. A ceiling that is too rigid can shift consumption patterns, squeeze margins or cause shortages. Hence the difference between a panic-relief measure and a structural policy. The former seeks to prevent a temporary spike from becoming a social or industrial crisis: it uses the budget, stockpiles and, in some cases, large companies to buy time – weeks or months. The latter permanently replaces the price signal. If, during a supply crisis, it becomes less profitable to produce, refine, import or invest, the future availability of energy risks decreasing rather than increasing.

The Eni-IP case reveals a great deal. The cap is time-limited, linked to market trends and does not seek to set the ‘fair price’ of petrol by law. It acts as a buffer. The experience of 2022 shows that emergency measures can stabilise markets if accompanied by stockpiling, new supply, a reduction in demand and diversification.

And this is the crux of energy crises. Buying time means acknowledging that the shock exists and limiting the damage. Looking for a scapegoat, on the other hand, means assuming that behind every high price there must be a culprit to be punished. The two are not the same. The former leaves the way open for a return to normality; the latter risks turning the shock into a permanent problem of investment and production. When there is a shortage of energy, the crucial question is not merely who should foot the bill. It is how to ensure there is more of it tomorrow.