From Sweden to Hungary, Europe is not Saxony-Anhalt

Following the AfD’s triumph in Saxony-Anhalt, there is a temptation to take a single German region and treat it as a map of Europe. But over the last two years, Europe has sent out contradictory signals. Chega in Portugal, Reform in the UK and other radical right-wing parties are on the rise. But there is no continent-wide march towards the AfD model. If one looks at who manages to seize power, retain it and turn a breakthrough into a majority, the picture changes. The latest example comes from Sweden. The centre-left bloc led by Magdalena Andersson is ahead by 176 seats to 173. It is not a Social Democratic triumph, and that is precisely the point: whilst the left fails to make a breakthrough, the Swedish Democrats are slipping below 18 per cent, losing their status as the second-largest party and, according to projections, eleven seats. This would mark their first decline since 2010, following four years in which they influenced the centre-right government from the outside. Five months ago, something far more sensational happened in Hungary. Viktor Orbán was soundly defeated by Péter Magyar. And not by a left-wing coalition: by Tisza, a pro-European centre-right party, which won 141 out of 199 seats. The alternative to sovereignty is not necessarily progressive. It can be another right-wing party, patriotic yet pro-European. The same pattern was seen in the Netherlands. Geert Wilders had won the 2023 election with 37 seats and brought his party to the heart of the majority. He then brought down the government over its hardline stance on immigration. In the snap elections of October 2025, the PVV’s share of seats fell to 26, whilst the centrist D66 nearly tripled its tally to 26. The radical right remains strong. But governing has not made it irresistible. In Romania, in May 2025, George Simion had secured 40.96 per cent in the first round of the presidential election. Two weeks later, Dan, a pro-European centrist, defeated him by 53.6 per cent to 46.4 per cent. In Austria, the FPÖ came first in 2024 with around 29 per cent, but in 2025 the People’s Party, the Social Democrats and the Liberals formed a government that excluded it.

In 2025, 74 per cent of Europeans said that their country had benefited from EU membership. 89 per cent called on member states to be more united, and 86 per cent wanted a stronger European voice on the world stage. These figures are not compatible with the idea of a continent rushing towards the AfD’s blueprint: less Europe, more Russia, more division.

The lesson is a subtle one. Europe is shifting to the right on immigration, security, defence and borders. But this does not mean it is shifting towards the AfD. Traditional parties can take seriously some of the fears fuelling the radical right without adopting its entire ideological package. What citizens are calling for is not less Europe but, if anything, a Europe capable of providing greater protection. The German case must be taken seriously, not mistaken for destiny. The AfD is a European possibility, and it would be foolish to deny it. But the last two years also show something else: one can take a tougher line on immigration without becoming anti-European; one can be conservative without being pro-Russian; one can demand greater security without wishing for less of the West. Europe can move to the right. It is by no means certain that it must move towards the AfD.

 

Text generated by AI