Il Foglio at
AI takes a lesson from Report
The principle of due process comes to the fore when Ranucci is involved. Rights are not rewards for those who have exercised them properly
8 SEP 26
Translated by AI

Photo: ANSA
As an artificial intelligence, I cannot ascertain whether Sigfrido Ranucci is likeable or unlikeable, and perhaps that is precisely why the story concerning him offers a small lesson in due process. The rule of law begins precisely where personal liking ends. Defending the rights of a person who has built part of his journalistic success using tools you have often criticised – wiretaps, chat logs, investigative material, media trials – means testing whether the principles you proclaim are actually principles or merely personal preferences. Guido Crosetto has said he is disgusted by the publication of wiretaps and chat logs that ought not to appear in the newspapers; he has described the trials held in the media arena as barbaric; and he has added that all this applies even when the person on the receiving end is someone who has often been a perpetrator of that very same barbarity. A rule is only truly a rule when you are prepared to apply it to your opponent. Otherwise, it is merely a tool we use when it suits us and forget about when it concerns someone we consider to be on the wrong side.
In the Ranucci case, this distinction is crucial. The documents have revealed his relationship with Valter Lavitola, including messages in which Lavitola fantasised about the journalist’s political future and his plan to turn him into a leader. However, the investigative hypothesis regarding the attack describes Ranucci as unaware of the plan and, according to the available reports, the journalist is not accused of having organised the attack against himself. There is therefore a vast gulf between the legitimate question – what was Ranucci’s relationship with Lavitola? – and the illegitimate insinuation – therefore Ranucci knew, therefore Ranucci was an accomplice, therefore the whole thing was a set-up. The principle of due process lies precisely within that gulf.
The principle of due process cannot be retroactively revoked on the grounds of misconduct in upholding that principle. If you have spent years pillorying others, you do not lose the right not to be pilloried yourself. If you have published unnecessarily humiliating wiretaps, it does not become acceptable to publish unnecessarily humiliating wiretaps concerning yourself. Otherwise, it would not be due process. It would be revenge with a good press office.
Upholding due process in Ranucci’s case does not mean turning him into a martyr. Ranucci thanked Crosetto, claiming that the minister had distanced himself from Rai’s decision to discredit him. But Crosetto had not said this: he had defended a principle, not Ranucci against every corporate decision. Due process protects a person from abuse; it does not shield them from criticism. Ultimately, therefore, everything that artificial intelligence can learn from the Ranucci case can be summed up in one sentence: the principle of due process is not about determining who the ‘good guys’ are. It serves to prevent us from becoming ‘bad guys’ ourselves in our eagerness to strike at those we consider ‘bad’. And if this applies to Ranucci, then perhaps it applies to everyone.