The right can win without Vannacci, provided it doesn’t do anything foolish

The starting point is less dramatic than it seems. In the latest Agi/YouTrend Supermedia poll, Futuro Nazionale reached 6.5 per cent, ahead of the Lega, which remained at 5.9 per cent. However, without Vannacci, the governing coalition is estimated at 42.2 per cent: just above the threshold which, under the electoral law approved by the Chamber of Deputies, would trigger the majority bonus. The broad coalition is ahead at 44.3 per cent, so the problem does exist. But the centre-right is already competitive today without him. The reason is simple: a vote for Vannacci is not necessarily a vote definitively taken away from the centre-right. It is partly a protest vote and a warning; it serves to tell Meloni and, above all, Salvini that on immigration, security, identity and Europe, a section of the electorate considers the governing right to be too cautious. But there is a huge difference between expressing discontent a year before the elections and choosing who should go to Palazzo Chigi. Polls capture a sense of identity. Elections distribute power. The Italian right knows this rule well. In 1996, the Lega ran alone, secured more than ten per cent of the vote and contributed to the defeat of the Polo. Five years later, Berlusconi rebuilt the Casa delle Libertà, brought Bossi back into the coalition and won by a clear margin. In 2008, with the People of Freedom and the League allied, the centre-right returned to government with almost 47 per cent. In 2022, the coalition led by Giorgia Meloni reached around 44 per cent and secured a large majority. The moral of the story is not that the right should take anyone on board. The ‘useful vote’, on the right, works in a particular way. On the left, it is often invoked as moral blackmail: vote for the largest party to stop the right. On the right, it functions as an instinct for power: vote for whoever can win, because coming first without governing is pointless. This is why, in the Second Republic, the right was able to hold together liberals and nationalists, autonomists and centralists, moderates and radicals. Not because they agreed on everything, but on one thing: win first, argue later. Vannacci will try to overturn this argument. He will say that without him the centre-right cannot secure a majority, that Meloni needs his votes, and that the ‘useful vote’ is the one cast for whoever will force the government to shift further to the right. If the contest becomes a two-horse race, if the electoral bonus kicks in at 42 per cent and if the centre-right presents clear leadership, some of the voters currently drawn to Futuro Nazionale might ask themselves not which party best expresses their anger, but which vote will prevent Schlein and Conte from winning. And here’s the advice: don’t do anything foolish. Don’t chase Vannacci on his own turf. But don’t insult his voters either; don’t treat them as unpresentable; don’t hand him a monopoly on real issues such as security, immigration and border control. Don’t turn the general into a martyr of a system that wants to silence him. And don’t build a campaign based entirely on fear of him. The right can win without Vannacci if it goes back to doing what it does best: offering a broad political home, recognisable leadership and the sense that a vote cast outside the coalition, whilst loud, is ultimately powerless. The general currently enjoys significant support. However, he does not control his voters. They may change their minds, backtrack or, at the last moment, choose the most useful vote.