Mistaking Beijing’s power for an inevitable fate

Is China’s power real or exaggerated? The most sensible answer is: real in terms of figures, exaggerated in terms of prophecy. It is real when one looks at what China is already capable of producing, exporting and influencing. It is exaggerated when one deduces from these results that overtaking the United States is inevitable and that the West has already lost the game. Beijing’s most tangible strength lies not in propaganda, but in its manufacturing sector. China controls over 80 per cent of the key production stages for solar panels and dominates the battery, electric vehicle, shipbuilding and many clean technology sectors. In 2025, Chinese exports of energy technologies exceeded $165 billion, accounting for roughly half of global trade in the sector, excluding intra-European trade. The same ambition is evident in artificial intelligence. Xi does not merely want competitive models: he wants China to help set the standards, train emerging nations and offer them open-source technologies that are less expensive than their Western counterparts. Nearly thirty countries have joined the new organisation promoted by Beijing, and some Western firms are experimenting with Chinese models. The gap with American laboratories has not disappeared, but it is narrowing. China has realised that technological power is not just about inventing: it is about creating dependencies, alliances and rules. Its military might is also a reality. In 2025, Beijing spent around $336 billion on defence, compared with $954 billion in the United States. China can intimidate its neighbours, exert increasing pressure on Taiwan and alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific; however, it does not yet possess the global network of alliances and bases that underpins American power. The most serious limitation is economic. China’s GDP grew by 5 per cent in 2025, and the International Monetary Fund forecasts 4.6 per cent growth for 2026. However, in the first half of this year, growth fell to 4.7 per cent and the model is showing deep cracks: a property crisis, local government debt, inefficient investment, weak domestic demand and deflationary pressures. The International Monetary Fund is calling on Beijing to shift resources from investment towards social protection and consumption. China’s vast manufacturing sector produces a great deal, but Chinese households are not buying enough. Then there is the demographic situation. In 2025, the population fell by 3.39 million people: 7.92 million births compared with 11.31 million deaths. An ageing society has fewer workers and must spend more on pensions and healthcare. Authoritarian control may speed up an industrial decision, but it cannot order families to have children, entrepreneurs to have confidence, or investors to ignore political arbitrariness.

Herein lies the Chinese paradox. The centralised system allows resources to be concentrated at an impressive rate, but that very concentration can stifle information, punish mistakes and discourage private initiative. Xi can build a supply chain; he cannot manufacture trust by decree. China must therefore be taken seriously without being mythologised. To underestimate it is to fail to see that the West has left too many strategic industries in its hands. To overestimate it is to believe the propaganda that democracy, the market and freedom are outdated concepts. China is not a paper tiger, but neither is it an invincible machine. It is a genuine superpower, burdened by genuine contradictions. The game is only lost when the West decides it is.