The Tobin tax in Italy

The Meloni government has quadrupled the Tobin tax. It had doubled it in the previous Budget Act, and is doing so again in this one for 2027, generating 1.4 billion in revenue. There are two paradoxes in this decision: one economic and one political. The first is that of a government which, in words, declares its intention to attract foreign capital, make Italy more competitive and channel Italians’ savings towards productive investments; yet in practice, it quadruples a tax that penalises these very investments. The Tobin tax, in fact, is levied on transactions involving shares and financial instruments, thereby increasing costs for investors and reducing the attractiveness of the Italian market.

The second paradox is political, and perhaps even more curious. The Tobin tax is a long-standing cause of the anti-globalisation movement: it was vigorously revived in 2001 as a means of curbing financial speculation. Ten years later, in 2012, it was Mario Monti’s technocratic government that introduced it in Italy. Two political and cultural eras from which Giorgia Meloni has always sought to distance herself as far as possible. Yet her government is not merely preserving this legacy but is actually strengthening it. Moreover, in its 2022 election manifesto, the Lega – the party of Economy Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti – explicitly promised to abolish the Tobin tax. Four years later, under Giorgetti—who was then the party’s deputy secretary and is now in charge of the Treasury—the tax has not only not been abolished but has been quadrupled.

In short, the Tobin tax has become a bipartisan tax in reverse: launched by the radical left, introduced by a technocratic government and now strengthened by a right-wing majority. But above all, it is the symbol of an economic policy that preaches the mobilisation and attraction of capital and then, when it needs to raise money, ends up harassing investors.