The Meloni government’s key nuclear pledge misses its summer deadline

The good wishes and promises made by the Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, on 13 May in the Senate in response to a question from Carlo Calenda regarding the establishment of a steering committee to address the country’s strategic priorities, and more recently, even in late July, by the Minister for the Environment and Energy Security, Gilberto Pichetto Fratin, were not enough; the draft enabling bill on “sustainable nuclear power” could not be passed before the summer recess.

Following approval by the Chamber of Deputies and its passage without amendments through the Senate’s Environment Committee, the bill has not been included in the final days of plenary proceedings. It will be discussed again after 14 September, whilst the deadline for tabling amendments is set for 10 September. It is easy to predict that there will be numerous amendments from the opposition, which may also attempt various – though certainly not decisive – filibustering manoeuvres. 

Once the bill has been approved, the government will have one year from the entry into force of the enabling act to adopt the implementing legislative decrees. The promise is that these will be in place before the end of the year. In this regard, however, it should be borne in mind that the end of the 19th parliamentary term is fast approaching and that it is unlikely the technical deadline of early October 2027 will be met. Furthermore, the budget bill, which is about to be tabled, will also capture attention and resources. All the more so as the bill will be better equipped than expected, thanks to the flexibility granted by the European Union regarding defence and energy expenditure.

Even if everything were to go smoothly – with the implementing decrees approved during this parliamentary term – there would still be regret that the government failed to seal the deal on the return to nuclear power without going into extra time. Or rather, without even playing it. Ideally, in fact, the current majority in this parliamentary term would have succeeded not only in passing the legislation but also in tackling the almost certain referendum challenge. The outcome, to be honest, is far from a foregone conclusion. The precedent set in 2011 – the only repeal referendum to have achieved the required quorum out of the eight held this century – should, in truth, be placed firmly in its historical context, taking into account, first and foremost, the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident.

Ahead of the highly likely referendum, in the current climate, the return to nuclear power will end up being swept up in the maelstrom of a heated election campaign, with the unfortunate side effect of becoming a weapon of mass distraction, as has historically been the case.

The current majority – which, in the 2022 framework programme agreement, had provided for ‘the use of energy production through the creation of state-of-the-art power stations without vetoes or preconceptions, whilst also considering the use of clean and safe nuclear power’, a somewhat vague formulation reflecting views within the coalition that are probably not entirely aligned – will have no choice but to reaffirm its commitment to implementing the regulations in the next parliamentary term. In this regard, it should, moreover, find ready support not only from the centrist group led by Calenda, Marattin and Picierno, but also from Futuro Nazionale. Nuclear energy, as it was once called, could serve as a unifying force – and, after all, that is no small matter.

The broad coalition – or whatever it may be called – will inevitably declare itself unanimously opposed – it would be difficult, for example, for Italia Viva to make a clear distinction – and commit not only to not implementing the provisions, but, to be on the safe side, to repealing the regulations that have been drafted, not without effort and with a certain indispensable cross-party consensus, even without the need for a referendum.

It should finally be clear to everyone that regulations are a necessary but not sufficient condition for an effective return to nuclear energy production in Italy. A broad, fundamental, cross-party and lasting consensus, which also widely involves ordinary people, will still need to be built. In this regard, we note that the enabling act does not provide for the establishment of an independent administrative authority for nuclear safety: the text refers to a review. It is true that, by international standards, a government agency – and thus a strengthening of the current National Inspectorate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ISIN) – would suffice; however, given the difficulty in achieving consensus, it is better to err on the side of caution and ensure the body is as authoritative as possible.