The working class? There are now three of them. The test of company-level collective agreements

Two supplementary company agreements signed in the very last few days prompt a more in-depth reflection on the structure and segmentation of the working class. The Barilla agreement is an excellent one for the food workers’ union, which has in fact welcomed it with great satisfaction. The approximately 4,000 employees will take home the substantial sum of €12,680 over the four-year period 2026–29, which may even be increased by a further 30 per cent. From a regulatory perspective, the industrial relations framework has also been strengthened by expanding the package of information and consultation rights, which will – for the first time in Italy – also cover investments in artificial intelligence. In addition, a select committee has been set up to serve as a forum for ‘prompt discussion’ on the group’s strategies. Other new provisions in the supplementary agreement concern the work-life balance, a cap on fixed-term contracts, and more training hours than stipulated in the contract.

From Parma to Trieste: for the first time, Illycaffè has negotiated a performance-related bonus with its in-house trade unions: €1,800 for both blue-collar and white-collar workers. “A historic first for the group,” said Chief Executive Cristina Scocchia. If an employee (of the 1,400 in total) chooses to convert the bonus into welfare benefits, the company will add a further 10 per cent. And this despite the fact that it is facing “a perfect storm” caused by geopolitical tensions, raw material costs and an exceptionally high price for green coffee.

But beyond the details, what do the Barilla and Illycaffè cases tell us? That we can no longer speak of manual labour – and, more generally, of manufacturing work – as a single, unified category. It is a world that is increasingly dividing into at least three distinct groups. The first comprises blue-collar workers and employees of small multinationals who renew their second-tier collective agreements; the second comprises workers covered solely by the national collective agreement; and the third comprises those in low-paid and casual work. A few years ago, the sociologist Antonio Schizzerotto had already spoken of three working classes; his analysis focused primarily on the organisation of work and technology. At the top was a sort of digital working-class aristocracy made up of 4.0 technicians and operators; in the middle were workers who remained within a traditional, Fordist-style organisation. However, the prominence that the issue of low wages has assumed in Italy, and the impact that inflation has had in recent years (and is likely to continue to have in the immediate future), lead us to ‘adjust’ Schizzerotto’s framework and, at least at this stage, to prioritise purchasing power as the decisive factor in inequality.

Firstly, as illustrated by the cases cited – as well as Luxottica, Ferrari, Ferrero, Lamborghini and many others – this is a working class that has secured significant gains in the redistribution of profits. Generally, they work in successful, well-managed companies with good profitability and a strong market position. They also enjoy excellent industrial relations, have no reason to go on strike, are unionised in significant numbers, and are able to negotiate not only good pay but also training, corporate welfare schemes and other benefits. They have a good rapport with the company, which translates into a strong sense of belonging. The second working-class group is predominantly employed in SMEs and relies on national collective agreement pay rises; they do not negotiate at the second-level bargaining table, have lower trade union membership, enjoy less job security than the first group, and work in less developed organisational contexts. Over the years of post-2022 inflation, this segment has suffered an 8 per cent reduction in purchasing power and, should inflation resume, would likely suffer further. It is true that in this world of SMEs, there is a widespread practice of granting individual "super-minimum" payments and so-called "under-the-table" payments without informing the trade union. “There are no precise figures to define the three segments of blue-collar workers, nor to understand how many SMEs resort to such practices or how many business owners give their employees petrol vouchers at Christmas,” notes Francesco Seghezzi of Adapt.

The ‘third working class’, already accurately identified by Schizzerotto, comprises workers in sectors with lower unionisation rates, such as logistics, tourism or care work. “It’s a form of work that’s often intermittent, in which people find themselves trapped and unable to break free,” explains Seghezzi. “In tourism, you might work for six months and claim Naspi for the other six. In home care, it involves carers or domestic workers who are often employed off the books. Job security is obviously non-existent, and maintaining purchasing power is a pipe dream. How many pubs and restaurants have we seen close down and be replaced by other chains?” Andrea Garnero, an OECD economist, adds: “Wage inequality is therefore determined by the type of business and not by the worker. Agreements such as those at Barilla or Illycaffè are welcome, but the question remains of how to lift others up. Moreover, segmentation hinders mobility; rights and pay are tied to the workplace and are therefore lost if one changes jobs.”