Alessandro Ferrara, intelligence analyst: “Political polarisation undermines national security”

“The twentieth century taught the intelligence services the value of knowing their adversary. This century demands they go one step further: to understand the vulnerabilities of the system they are called upon to protect.” Interview

22 NOV 26
Translated by AI
Alessandro Ferrara, intelligence analyst: “Political polarisation undermines national security”
When it comes to threats to national security, it is no longer enough simply to know who the enemies are: we must address the system’s vulnerabilities, because the greatest damage is not caused by serious risks, but by those for which we are unprepared. And on matters of national interest, greater cohesion is needed amongst the political parties. This is explained by Carabinieri General Alessandro Ferrara, formerly head of analysis at SISDE and later at AISI, and until last July editor-in-chief of ‘Gnosis’.
For decades, intelligence has meant countering threats. Is this still the case?
To a large extent, yes, and it is right to acknowledge this. Terrorism, organised crime, espionage: our professional culture was born to identify the adversary, understand their intentions and neutralise their capabilities. It is a tradition that has accompanied the country through some of the most difficult periods in the history of the Republic. It remains a legacy to be safeguarded, but it is no longer enough: an intelligence service that knows only the enemy knows only half the story. The other half is the system to be protected, with all its vulnerabilities. Alongside a culture of threat, we need a culture of risk.
What’s changing?
The question has changed: it is no longer just about who might target us, but why we might be targeted. In other words: what might prevent us from realising the future we wish to build. Every country, whether consciously or not, has a vision of its own future: objectives, interests, and expectations regarding development and well-being. It is the role of intelligence to identify not only external obstacles, but also the internal weaknesses that could undermine them. Intelligence is not designed to recount the past or to capture a snapshot of the present. Its task is to reduce uncertainty about what lies ahead and to provide decision-makers with the information they need to make choices. It occupies a sort of no-man’s-land, between what is and what could be. This is where strategic foresight comes into play.
Why shift the focus from threats to vulnerabilities?
Because threats are constantly changing: the actors, technologies and modus operandi. Vulnerabilities, however, are far more stable. They are the gateways through which both old and new threats attempt to gain entry: technological and energy dependencies, fragile infrastructure, economic vulnerabilities, regulatory shortcomings, cultural deficits and social polarisation. The person knocking may change, but the door remains the same. The 2022 energy crisis did not merely reveal an adversary: it confronted us with a dependency we had been aware of for years. The strategic strength of a system depends, first and foremost, on its ability to understand itself. This also applies to the barrage of hostile actions seen in recent days.
Hybrid threats?
Above all. Disinformation, cognitive warfare and influence operations do not act through force, but exploit existing vulnerabilities in the target. No disinformation campaign creates a social divide out of thin air, but amplifies those that already exist. No influence operation on its own generates mistrust in institutions, but fuels it where it already exists. No destabilisation strategy creates polarisation: it accentuates it, to the point of turning it into a national vulnerability. And there is a problem of asymmetry that exacerbates the situation: with modest investment, significant effects can be achieved if the environment is favourable.
And yet, major shocks always seem to come out of the blue.
Complex systems rarely collapse due to an extraordinary threat. More often than not, they enter a state of crisis when even a minor event exploits an underestimated vulnerability. The greatest damage is not necessarily caused by the most serious risk, but by the one that catches us unprepared. Reducing vulnerabilities is a worthwhile investment, whatever the threat may be.
What is the role of politics?
This is the crux of the matter: a cohesive country, with trust in its institutions, civic awareness and political debate that, whilst sometimes heated, is not destructive, offers little fodder to those seeking to destabilise it. Conversely, a highly polarised environment can become a vulnerability open to exploitation. History shows that, during the Republic’s most delicate moments, it was not only the security services that made the difference, but also the ability of institutions, political forces and public opinion to recognise a higher common interest: the preservation of democracy.
A call for national unity?
Yes, but let’s be clear: unity does not mean uniformity of thought or a renunciation of pluralism. It means sharing the awareness that there are common strategic assets, the protection of which takes precedence over legitimate political differences. Excessive polarisation creates rifts that invite hostile actors, propagates harmful effects and fuels the system’s self-destruction.
How should the intelligence services proceed?
By strengthening, alongside the approach of countering threats, that of anticipation. Not because the need to defend oneself ceases to exist, but because security is built before the threat manifests itself: by reducing exposure, strengthening resilience, and increasing society’s capacity to absorb shocks and attempts at destabilisation. From this perspective, vulnerabilities are not merely weaknesses to be corrected, but the vantage point from which to assess risk.
What has changed compared to the 20th century?
The twentieth century taught the intelligence community the value of understanding the adversary, in a tradition that stretches from Sun Tzu to Machiavelli and runs through the history of strategic thought. This century demands a further step: understanding the vulnerabilities of the system it is called upon to protect. Understanding the enemy remains essential. Understanding one’s own weaknesses becomes crucial.